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The Semisecret Life of Late Mao-Era 
International Law Scholarship 
 
By James D. Fry* & Huang Yining** 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The late University of Maryland law professor Hungdah 
Chiu wrote in 1987 that “no scholarly writings on international 
law were published in the People’s Republic of China” between 
1965 and 1979.1  This period often is referred to as the Cultural 
Revolution, which occurred during the latter half of the Mao era 
when the PRC’s founder Chairman Mao Zedong took back 
control over the Communist Party of China from the corrupting 
influences of experts and placed emphasis on the proletariat 
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1.  Hungdah Chiu, Chinese Attitudes Towards International Law in the 
Post-Mao Era, 1978-1987, 21 INT’L LAW. 1127, 1127 (1987), reprinted in 7 
CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 399 (1988); see also Hungdah Chiu, 
Communist China’s Attitude Toward International Law, 60 AM. J. INT’L L. 245, 
266–67 (1966) (stating “[many writers in Communist China] all deny the 
existence of a common science of international law. . . . The science of 
international law in Communist China is still in a very primitive stage.  Its 
contribution to this science, if any, is mainly in the field of compiling or editing 
documents.”) [hereinafter Communist China’s Attitude]; Detlev Vagts & 
Hungdah Chiu, A Concise Introduction to the New Areas of International Law, 
82 AM. J. INT’L L. 892, 893 (1988) (alluding to the same assertion). By 
“international law,” this Article means public international law, not private 
international law or international economic law, even though a broader 
definition of this phrase obviously would include these other aspects. 
1
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masses and on Mao himself.  Chiu’s assertion seems intuitively 
correct because it is no mystery that the PRC largely limited its 
international law-making efforts during this period,2 and it 
seems predictable that PRC international law scholarship would 
follow this pattern.  Nevertheless, Chiu’s definitive assertion 
essentially dares readers to prove him wrong.  Where other U.S.-
based international law scholars have preferred to follow 
instinctively,3 this Article began as a direct—although 
somewhat playful—response to that dare.  While an extensive 
review of Chinese literature and English translations of that 
literature uncovered only one clearly scholarly piece from that 
time period, these U.S.-based commentators nevertheless were 
wrong to overlook it.  The reference to “semisecret” in this 
Article’s title is an acknowledgement that contemporary 
Chinese scholars and institutions are fully aware of this 
scholarly piece, as its author Zhou Gengsheng is well respected 
and much discussed in Chinese circles for his unique 
contributions to international law, in addition to his 
contribution to the socialist legal system with his emphasis on 
classism. This Article identifies, analyzes and evaluates this 
Mao-era literature with an eye towards determining its 
scholarly significance, mainly for the benefit of a Western 
audience who lacks knowledge of this particular literature, in 
the hopes that future English-language studies can pay greater 
attention to the literature from this period and its impact on the 
PRC’s progress in the realm of international law.4  This Article 
 
2.  It is almost amusing how Rhode and Whitlock’s book about PRC 
treaties concluded between 1949 and 1978 mentions no treaties between 1965 
and 1978.  See GRANT F. RHODE & REID E. WHITLOCK, TREATIES OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1978: AN ANNOTATED COMPILATION 43 (1980) (listing 
the last treaty of the PRC from this period as one with Tanzania, which was 
signed on February 20, 1965). 
3.  See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 
n.144 (4th ed., 2003); Michael Bennett, The People’s Republic of China and the 
Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Disputes, 28 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
425, 443 (1992); James V. Feinerman, Chinese Participation in the 
International Legal Order, 141 CHINA Q. 186, 186 (1995); Samuel S. Kim, The 
Development of International Law in Post-Mao China, 1 J. CHINESE L. 117, 117 
(1987); Benjamin O. Kostrzewa, China International Economic Trade 
Arbitration Commission in 2006: New Rules, Same Results?, 15 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 519, 523 (2006). 
4.  See Tilmann Altwicker & Oliver Diggelmann, How is Progress 
Constructed in International Legal Scholarship?, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 425, 443–
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/10
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also joins with Wuhan University and other PRC institutions in 
commemorating Zhou Gengsheng’s 130th posthumous birthday. 
This Article is delimited by a focus on international law 
scholarship during the late Mao era, not on the PRC’s actual 
approach to or pronouncements on international law, mainly in 
order to respond directly to the assertion of U.S.-based 
international law scholars on late Mao-era scholarship.  Of 
course, considerable ambiguity surrounds what constitutes 
scholarly work; no legal or even consensus definition generally 
exists.  To be clear, definitions might exist in specific contexts 
such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”) of the 
United States, which prohibits foreign lobbying except for “bona-
fide religious, scholastic, academic or scientific pursuits or the 
fine arts,” inter alia, although the distinction between scholarly 
and other types of activities is left entirely ambiguous under the 
legislation and the case law.5  In this particular context, Chiu 
signaled in 1966 what he might have meant by scholarly when 
he added the qualification to similar assertions from the past 
that Mao-era international law commentators exhibited “a lack 
of interest in original studies of international law problems,”6 
suggesting that his definition of scholarly requires an element of 
originality and intellectual rigor concerning clearly identified 
problems.  Whether the plain-language definition of scholarly 
contains such elements depends on which dictionary one 
consults.  The Oxford English Dictionary refers to “learned, 
erudite” for its definition.7  The Cambridge English Dictionary 
defines scholarly as “containing a serious, detailed study of a 
subject,”8 which suggests the same type of study that a learned 
 
44 (2014) (noting how past perspectives on international law are important 
inasmuch as they have helped form current perspectives). 
5.  Foreign Agents Registration Act, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (1938), amended 
by 22 U.S.C. § 613(e) (emphasis added).  See generally Control of Communist 
Activities, 1 STAN. L. REV. 85 (1948); Murray L. Schwartz & James C. N. Paul, 
Foreign Communist Propaganda in the Mails: A Report on Some Problems of 
Federal Censorship, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 621 (1959); The Swampy Business of 
Lobbying for Foreign Governments, ECONOMIST (Sept. 22, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/09/22/the-swampy-business-of-
lobbying-for-foreign-governments. 
6.  Communist China’s Attitude, supra note 1, at 267. 
7.  Scholarly, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Ent 
ry/172492 (last visited June 4, 2019). 
8.  Scholarly, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridg 
3
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or erudite person would undertake.  As this Article looks at U.S.-
based international law scholars, it might be helpful to look at 
U.S. dictionaries.  The Merriam-Webster dictionary provides a 
similar definition as that of the Oxford English Dictionary— “of, 
characteristic of, or suitable to learned persons.”9  Collins 
Dictionary provides a first definition of “learned” and then a 
second of “having or showing much knowledge, accuracy, and 
critical ability.”10  Of course, accuracy might depend on the 
viewer’s perspective and the referent employed.  Regardless, an 
amalgam of these definitions would include a large measure of 
detailed knowledge and serious independence in expressing that 
detailed knowledge, which presumably would create some form 
of originality in addressing the problem at issue.  This Article 
uses all three elements—knowledge, independence and 
originality—to assess whether a particular Mao-era work 
between 1965 and 1979 represents a scholarly contribution. This 
is distinguished from non-scholarly contributions, which may 
relate to education but more closely resemble indoctrination and 
political propaganda.11 
Critics will emphasize that independent research was not 
possible during the Mao era, and so no scholarly work could have 
been produced.  Indeed, the Thought Reform campaigns between 
1949 to 1956, the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1957, the Great 
Leap Forward between 1958 to 1962, and the Cultural 
 
e.org/dictionary/english/scholarly (last visited June 4, 2019). 
9.  Scholarly, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/scholarly (last visited June 4, 2019). 
10.  Scholarly, COLLINS DICTIONARY, www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionar 
y/english/scholarly (last visited June 4, 2019). 
11.  To be clear, Mao emphasized education during the Cultural 
Revolution. See, e.g., Mao Tse-Tung: The People’s Emperor, in MAKERS OF 
WORLD HISTORY 244, 247-49 (J. Kelley Sowards ed., 2d ed. 1995) (three of the 
seven directives by Mao related to education, with the second emphasizing the 
importance of science and engineering at China’s universities, the fourth 
underlining the key role of workers in embedding proletariat values within 
China’s education system, and the sixth highlighting the need for youth to be 
educated by peasants in the countryside). While Mao seems to have opposed 
the type of critical thinking that forms the bedrock of modern liberal education, 
he nonetheless saw a type of education—something Western scholars might 
see as akin to indoctrination—as being central to his overarching vision for the 
PRC. Regardless, this Article distinguishes such an emphasis on education 
from genuinely scholarly endeavors that are based on knowledge, 
independence and originality.   
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/10
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Revolution between 1966 to 1976 all essentially devastated 
academic and intellectual freedom, to put it mildly.12  Was it 
possible to produce scholarly works without a robust legal 
academy?  Was it even possible to be scholarly, in particular, 
independent, when the threat of re-education camps or worse 
loomed in the minds of commentators at that time? Despite 
these valid questions, the research results contained in this 
Article suggest that at least one Mao-era commentator—Zhou 
Gengsheng—exhibited sufficient knowledge, independence and 
originality when describing and analyzing the international 
legal system, beyond being a mere propaganda tool, to constitute 
scholarly work.  If one can tolerate a lesser degree of originality, 
the number of scholarly works from this period would increase.  
The lesser degree of originality comes not in the form of copying, 
as some commentators assert,13 but in the form of commentaries 
and glossaries accompanying compilations of primary sources of 
international law, as with Wang Tieya’s Materials on the Law of 
the Sea.14  Despite such potential flexibility with originality, 
independence must remain intact or else the line between 
scholarship and propaganda becomes blurred beyond 
recognition.  This stricter requirement for independence means 
 
12.  See generally PATRICIA BUCKLEY EBREY, THE CAMBRIDGE ILLUSTRATED 
HISTORY OF CHINA 305–08 (2010); ANDREW G. WALDER, CHINA UNDER MAO: A 
REVOLUTION DERAILED 124, 135–37, 140, 142 180–81, 185–88, 267–68 (2015); 
Ronald St. John MacDonald, Wang Tieya: Persevering in Adversity and 
Shaping the Future of Public International Law in China, introduction to 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 1, 15–21 (Ronald St. John MacDonald ed. 
1994) (discussing these events from the perspective of Wang Tieya); Stephen 
Minas, “Kill Fewer, Kill Carefully”: An Analysis of the 2006 to 2007 Death 
Penalty Reforms in China, 27 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 36, 47–48 (2009). 
13.  See He Qinhua, China’s Transplantation of Soviet International Law 
after the 1950s [中国对苏联国际法的移植], 2 JINLING L. REV. [金陵法律评论], 89 
(2001).  The fact that Mao-era scholarship and contemporary Western sources 
were produced in different languages frustrates efforts to definitively 
determine the existence of copying using such software as Turnitin.  
Nevertheless, a comparison of Chinese and U.S. international law scholarship 
from roughly this time period, especially tables of contents and the structural 
arrangement of arguments, provides no evidence of copying.  Perhaps future 
tools will be more effective at detecting such types of copying. 
14.  See Li Yu-min, An Analysis on the Fundamental Form of the Sino-
foreign Treaty Relationship in Late Qing Dynasty [北京大学法律系国际法教研室
], SHI LIN [史林] (2016); Chen Huiqing, China and the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea: Historical Review,Experiences and Lessons [海洋法资料汇编] 3 
WUHAN UNIV. INT’L L. REV. (2017); PEOPLE’S PUBLISHING HOUSE [人民出版社] 
(1974) [hereinafter Wang’s Materials on the Law of the Sea]. 
5
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that the work of Mao-era officials must be excluded from this 
study, even when that work may have reflected some elements 
of originality and serious knowledge of international law, such 
as Mao’s own writings on international law.15  While U.S.-based 
international law scholars generally were correct in describing 
the Mao-era PRC’s distrust of international law as an 
imperialist tool,16 which also would be an apt description of the 
Soviet view of international law at this time,17 this does not 
mean that no one within the PRC between 1965 and 1979 wrote 
about international law from a scholarly perspective.  This 
Article analyzes and evaluates that literature to show that at 
least some PRC international law scholarship was created 
during the time period in question. 
 
II.  Research Methodology 
 
A thorough review of Chinese literature and English 
translations of that literature reveals a relatively significant 
body of Mao-era international law scholarship, at least 
compared to how U.S.-based scholars have described this period 
in the past.  This Part identifies that literature.  Before doing so, 
however, a few words must be said about this Article’s 
methodology.  The research for the Article began from broad 
archival research, including official documents, newspapers, 
magazine articles and academic publications produced in the 
PRC from 1965 to 1979, as well as English translations of these 
 
15.  See, e.g., ZEDONG MAO, On Coalition Government, in SELECTED WORKS 
OF MAO TSE-TUNG 119–25 (1945) (outlining the CPC’s approach to 
international law); ZEDONG MAO, On the Outrages by British Warships: 
Statement by the Spokesman of the General Headquarters of the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army, in IV SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 1349–51 
(Renmin Univ. ed. 1949). 
16.  See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 3, at 442–43; Jacques deLisle, China’s 
Approach to International Law: A Historical Perspective, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 267, 272–73 (2000). 
17.  See generally KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1970); G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (William E. Butler 
trans. 1974); Kazimierz Grzybowski, Soviet Theory of International Law for the 
Seventies, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 862 (1983).  Please note that the purpose of this 
Article is not to compare Soviet and PRC approaches or Western and PRC 
approaches to international law.  The occasional comparisons in this Article 
between Zhou’s book and Western international law textbooks is intended to 
be illustrative, not exhaustive. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/10
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types of materials, with the aim of uncovering absolutely all 
international law scholarship and references to such scholarship 
from this period.  There were three stages to this archival 
research.  This research began with electronic searches for 
references to guojifa (国际法 or international law) and to guoji 
gongfa (国际公法 or public international law) in two databases: 
the China Academic Journals Full-text Database (“CAJ”) (中国
期刊全文数据库 or Zhongguo Qikan Quanwen Shujuku) from the 
China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database (“CNKI”) (中国
知识基础设施工程, 中国知网, Zhongguo Zhishi Jichu Sheshi 
Gongcheng or Zhongguo Zhiwang), and The People’s Data (人民
数据库 or Renmin Sujuku), which returned articles from Renmin 
Ribao (人民日报 or The People’s Daily), Ta-Kung Pao (大公报 or 
The Impartial Daily) and Xinhuashe (新华社 or The Xinhua 
News Agency), among others.  These searches returned 
thousands of articles, seven of which were seen as potentially 
containing or referring to the type of knowledgeable, 
independent and original work that one would expect of truly 
scholarly writings, and all of them were authored by the famous 
international law scholar Wang Tieya.  Given Wang Tieya’s 
unequivocal expertise in international law,18 it originally was 
hoped that these newspaper articles relating to the United 
Nations and appearing in the The People’s Daily and Beijing’s 
Impartial Daily (or Ta-Kung Pao) between 1965 and 1967 would 
be sufficiently scholarly to be included in this study.  However, 
they ultimately did not make it into this Article because of their 
overwhelmingly propagandistic and ideological tone, which is 
reflected in their titles: 
 
− The United Nations is a Tool of Aggression of 
the US Imperialists19; 
− Superstitious Beliefs Concerning the United 
Nations Must be Discarded20; 
 
18.  See generally MacDonald, supra note 12; Wang Tieya, International 
Law in China: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 221 REC. DES COURS 
195 (1990-II); Dorothee de Sampayo & Garrido-Nijgh, Judge Wang: Citizen of 
the World, 4 J. HIST. INT’L L. 238 (2002). 
19.  Wang Tieya [王铁崖], The United Nations is a Tool of Aggression by 
U.S. Imperialists [联合国是美帝国主义的侵略工具], IMPARTIAL DAILY [TA-KUNG 
PAO], Jan. 9, 1965, at 4. 
20.  Wang Tieya [王铁崖], Superstitious Beliefs Concerning the United 
7
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− Look! What a Mess the United Nations has 
Become21; 
− The United Nations Must Undergo a Thorough 
Re-organization22; 
− The Fundamental Problem of the United 
Nations is to Break U.S. Control23; 
− China Asks for Nothing from the United 
Nations24; and 
− An Ugly Drama in the United Nations.25 
 
A detailed analysis of the content of each confirmed this initial 
impression.  The other results from the searches of these 
databases similarly lacked the requisite knowledge, 
independence and originality.  Representative pieces of this 
group would include Hsiang-Yang Chi’s article Smash the New 
Tsars’ Theory of ‘Limited Sovereignty,’ which was translated into 
English,26 or Zhu Fu’s article Rusk’s ‘International Law’ Cannot 
Conceal the Crime of Aggression against Vietnam by American 
Imperialism,27 not to mention myriad articles relating to the 
transfer of the U.N. seat to the PRC and border disputes with 
the Soviet Union, among many other international disputes. All 
 
Nations Must be Discarded [必须破除对联合国的迷信], IMPARTIAL DAILY [TA-
KUNG PAO], Jan. 10, 1965, p. 1 [hereinafter Superstitious Beliefs]. 
21.  Wang Tieya [王铁崖], Look! What a Mess the United Nations has 
Become [看，联合国还象个什么样子], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Feb. 25, 1965 
[hereinafter Look!]. 
22.  Wang Tieya [王铁崖], The United Nations Must Undergo a Thorough 
Re-Organization [联合国必须彻底改组], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], June 26, 
1965, at 5. 
23.  Wang Tieya [王铁崖], Fundamental Problem of the United Nations is 
to Break U.S. Control [联合国的根本问题是要打破美国的控制], PEOPLE’S DAILY [
人民日报], Nov. 19, 1965, at 1 [hereinafter Fundamental Problem]. 
24.  Wang Tieya [王铁崖], China Asks for Nothing from the United Nations 
[中国无求于联合国], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Dec. 2, 1966, at 4 [hereinafter 
China Asks for Nothing]. 
25.  Wang Tieya [王铁崖], An Ugly Drama in the United Nations [联合国
的一幕丑剧], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], July 8, 1967, at 6 [hereinafter An Ugly 
Drama]. 
26.  Chi Hsiang-Yang, Smash the New Tsars’ Theory of “Limited 
Sovereignty,” 3 CHINESE L. GOV’T 84 (1969). 
27.  See Fu Zhu [傅朱], Rusk’s “International Law” Cannot Conceal the 
Crime of Aggression against Vietnam by American Imperialism [腊斯克的”国际
法”掩盖不了美帝的侵越罪行], 2 CHINESE J. L. [法学研究] 8 (1965). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/10
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presumably reflected the PRC’s position on the relevant issues, 
but none reflected a sufficiently high level of knowledge, 
independence or originality to be included in this study. 
The research then shifted to a review of the material 
contained in the journal Chinese Law and Government: A 
Journal of Translation, which was published by the U.S. 
publisher International Arts and Sciences Press, starting in 
1968, but which contained translations of articles originally 
written in the PRC in the 1950s and early 1960s, many of which 
were overwhelmingly authentic in nature.28  This search did not 
uncover any scholarly work from the time period in question.  
The research then proceeded to the National Library of China in 
Beijing, where a review of hardcopy materials available to the 
public turned out to be the most reliable method of finding 
relevant materials from this time period. 
Again, it was hoped that Wang’s three-volume Selected 
Materials on Modern European International Relations 1870-
1919 would contain sufficient commentary on international law 
mixed in with his review of European international relations, 
especially with regard to European treaty law at the time.  
However, after a thorough review of that three-volume set, this 
did not prove to be the case.  This presumably was the result of 
Wang Tieya having to set aside his interests in international law 
when he joined the Peking University’s History Department in 
1952 following the Mind Reform Movement and the subsequent 
abolition of the Law and Political Science Departments for being 
too bourgeois.29  The same is true for Wang Tieya’s updated 
Chinese translation of the eighth edition of Oppenheim’s 
International Law that he worked on during the Mao era (but 
did not come out until 1995), in which he noted in a preface—
Wang’s sole editorial comment in the book—that “Oppenheim’s 
work is very welcome in China” because it “contains diverse 
Western viewpoints on international law.”30 
 
28.  See, e.g., Chou Keng-Sheng, New Trends in Contemporary Anglo-
American Theory of International Law, 3 CHINESE L. GOV’T 20 (1970) 
(published originally in Chinese in 1963; Chou Keng-Sheng is another way to 
write Zhou Gengsheng). 
29.  See generally MacDonald, supra note 12, at 13–14. 
30.  See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW [奥本海国际法] vi (Wang Tieya 
trans., 8th ed. 1995); see also 
de Sampayo & Nijgh, supra note 18, at 238 (nothing that Wang worked on the 
9
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Another candidate for inclusion in this study was Wang 
Tieya’s 1974 collection entitled Materials on the Law of the Sea, 
which contained the key PRC and UN documents relating to the 
law of the sea leading up to this period.31  The skillful selection 
of materials helps give the reader a glimpse into the PRC 
government’s position concerning the law of the sea during this 
period, with a clear emphasis on state sovereignty, as well as its 
animosity towards colonialism and hegemony.32  However, this 
Article does not include this collection among the scholarly work 
from this period because only the minimal glossary of terms at 
the back of the collection showed genuinely original work by 
Wang,33 and it arguably is not sufficient to satisfy this Article’s 
definition of scholarship. 
By far the most significant source from this time period is a 
two-volume textbook from 1976 by Zhou Gengsheng entitled 
International Law.34  Zhou affectionately was called the “Dean” 
of Chinese international legal scholars and legal scholars in 
general, and this two-volume textbook appears to represent his 
life’s work.35  According to Chen Tiqiang, Ronald St. John 
MacDonald (relying extensively on multiple interviews with 
Wang Tieya) and others, Zhou’s International Law was finished 
in 1969, but not published until 1976 due to the political tensions 
at that time.36  Regardless, both of the 1969 and 1976 dates fit 
 
translation along with T.C. Chen). 
31.  See generally Wang’s Materials on the Law of the Sea, supra note 14.  
32.  See generally id. 
33.  See id. at 520–21. 
34.  ZHOU GENGSHENG [周鲠生], INTERNATIONAL LAW [国际法] (1976) 
[hereinafter ZHOU]. 
35.  See MacDonald, supra note 12, at 5–6 (quoting from an interview with 
Wang Tieya); see also ZHOU, supra note 34, at 7–8 (noting that Zhou was 
Wang’s mentor and friend); Wang Tieya, Teaching and Research of 
International Law in Present Day China, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 77, 78 
(1983) (describing Wang’s relationship with Zhou); Chen Tiqiang, 
International Law by Zhou Gengsheng, in SELECTED ARTICLES FROM THE 
CHINESE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 240 (Chinese Soc. Int’l L. ed. 1983) 
(book review) (“Those in China who studied international law after 1925 were 
all his students, either in college or under his private tutorship”). 
36.  See MacDonald, supra note 12, at 5 (internal citations omitted); 
Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 240; LI MOUSHENG, THE BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF 
PROFESSOR ZHOU GENG SHENG [ZHOU GENG SHENG JIAO SHOU ZHUAN LVE]; see 
also Leo Gross & Vratislav Pechota, Selected Articles from Chinese Yearbook of 
International Law, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 851, 853–54 (1985) (book review). 
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within the 1965 to 1979 period in question.37  Hungdah Chiu 
asserts that Zhou’s book was completed in 1964,38 presumably 
because the publisher of the 1976 version Commercial Press 
inserted a preface stating Zhou did not work on the manuscript 
after 1964 due to illness, which the publisher of the 2007 version 
Wuhan University Press repeated in an abbreviated form.39  
This 1964 completion date enables Hungdah Chiu to maintain 
his claim that there was no international law scholarship in the 
PRC between 1965 and 1979, notwithstanding the 1976 
publication date.  However, four factors undermine the 
reliability of the 1964 completion date in the preface.  First, it is 
not difficult to imagine how Commercial Press had political 
reasons for giving (and Wuhan University Press repeating) an 
incorrect completion date, as this sort of work was not supposed 
to have been produced during the Cultural Revolution.  
Additionally, these publishers were seen as tools of the 
Communist Party of China.  At the same time, Chen Tiqiang and 
Wang Tieya had no conceivable reason for giving an incorrect 
date.  Interestingly, the preface to the 1976 version of Zhou’s 
International Law provides a disclaimer that Zhou’s focus was 
on Western bourgeois international law, his ideas reflected an 
influence from Western and Soviet sources that was wrong (even 
though he extensively criticized these works), and the reader 
should be cautious and use a Marxist-Leninist and Maoist way 
of interpreting the book.40  This detailed disclaimer does not 
appear in the 1981 or 2007 versions, although the 2007 version 
repeats the assertion that the book was completed in 1964 due 
to Zhou’s illness.  Second, the preface in the 1976 version states 
that the book was only internally released for use by diplomats 
 
37.  See MacDonald, supra note 12, at 5. 
38.  See Leo Gross & Hangdah Chiu, Guoji Fa (International Law), 77 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 977, 977 (1983) (book review) [hereinafter Chiu Book Review]; see 
also Wolfgang Kess, International Law, 16 VERFASSUNG UND RECHT ÜBERSEE 
204 (1983); Kim, supra note 3, at 127; Zhang Wenbing, International Law: 
Western Traditions and Chinese Characteristics—Re-reading Zhou 
Gengsheng’s International Law [国际法：西方传统与中国特色—重读周鲠生《国
际法》随想], 7 J. COMP. L. [比较法学研究] 187 (1993). 
39.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at i; ZHOU GENGSHENG [周鲠生], 1 
INTERNATIONAL LAW [国际法], at preface p. x, (Wuhan University Press [武汉大
学出版社] 2007).  Interestingly, Commercial Press did not include this preface 
in its 1981 version of that book. 
40.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at i. 
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and academics.41  However, a search of the Online Computer 
Library Center’s WorldCat union catalog shows that twenty-six 
of the 72,000 libraries on that database have the 1976 version 
(including libraries in Hong Kong and Taiwan), whereas only 
four libraries have the 1981 version (including libraries in the 
United Kingdom and the United States).  This suggests a 
broader circulation than just internally, given that it is 
somewhat difficult to see Hong Kong or Taiwan as being 
“internal” in the 1960s, notwithstanding the PRC’s claims to 
these territories.  This apparent misstatement brings up the 
possibility that the assertion of a 1964 completion date also was 
incorrect.  Third, Zhou apparently wrote International Law in 
his later years while he was sick,42 which would mean that his 
becoming sick did not determine when he stopped working on 
the book, as Commercial Press and Wuhan University Press 
claimed.  Fourth, Chen Tiqiang and Wang Tieya were 
contemporaries and colleagues of Zhou,43 and so they 
presumably would have had more reliable, firsthand knowledge 
of when Zhou completed the 1976 book than the publishers. 
Critics will point to content within Zhou’s book that 
suggests that it was completed before the Cultural Revolution.   
For example, as explained in Part III(6)(e) below, Zhou wrote 
that no international convention regulating outer space existed 
at that time.44 However, it is common knowledge that the first 
outer space treaty—the Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Mood and Other Celestial Bodies—was concluded 
in 1967, thereby suggesting that Zhou had completed the book 
before 1967.  This point assumes that Zhou was perfectly up-to-
date on all areas of international law at the time of writing the 
book (which might not have been the case), it assumes that all 
parts  of  the  book  were  completed  at  the  same  time,  and  it 
 
 
41.  See id. 
42.  See He Qinhua, Travelling Around Europe and Asia: The Father of 
International Law in China [游学欧亚的周鲠生：中国近代国际法之父], Jan. 5, 
2010; HAN YANGUANG, ENCYCLOPEDIA SINITICA: VOLUME OF LAW [中国大百科全
书：法学篇] 810 (1984); Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 241. 
43.  See MacDonald, supra note 12, at 5; Tieya, supra note 35, at 78 
(describing Wang’s relationship with Zhou). 
44.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 413. 
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assumes that the period between 1965 and 1967 is not relevant 
to this study, which it is. 
Regardless, none of these factors change the undisputed fact 
that the book came out in 1976, which is the usual way to ascribe 
a date to a publication, not the date of manuscript completion,45 
and which is well within the 1965 to 1979 timeframe in question.  
Of course, with the knowledge that books and articles with a 
publication date during the post-Mao era could have been 
produced during the part of the Mao era in question, there could 
be many more pertinent publications to include in this Article.  
However, there is no easy way to tell when manuscripts were 
produced, which constitutes a real barrier in providing a 
complete census of late-Mao-era international law scholarship.  
Notwithstanding this disclaimer, your authors feel relatively 
confident that this Article has dealt with all of the main late-
Mao-era international law scholarship that currently is publicly 
available. 
At least three English-language book reviews have been 
written on Zhou’s book by U.S.-based or U.S.-trained 
international law scholars,46 and at least four additional sources 
have cited the 1976 version of Zhou’s book.47  Therefore, it is 
clear that Zhou’s book is well known, or should be well known, 
among international law scholars, making it that much more 
surprising that commentators continue to maintain that no 
international law scholarship was produced between 1965 and 
1979.  At the same time, as most of these reviews were on the 
brief side—including a one-paragraph review and a one-page 
review—this Article adds value by providing the most detailed 
review to date. 
As the following parts show, the knowledge, independence 
and originality contained in Zhou Gengsheng’s International 
Law arguably are sufficient to categorize it as scholarly, thereby 
 
45.  See BOOK INDUSTRY STUDY GROUP, BEST PRACTICES FOR PRODUCT 
METADATA 169–70 (2015).  
46.  See Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 240; Chiu Book Review, supra note 38, 
at 977; Kess, supra note 38, at 204. 
47.  See, e.g., Kim, supra note 3, at 121, 127; Pasha L. Hsieh, The 
Discipline of International Law in Republican China and Contemporary 
Taiwan, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 87, 119–20 (2015); Wei Wang, 
Historical Evolution of National Treatment in China, 39 INT’L LAW. 759, 760–
61 (2005); Gross & Pechota, supra note 36, at 853–54. 
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refuting the notion that no international law scholarship was 
produced in the People’s Republic of China between 1965 and 
1979.  The fact that no PRC international law scholars make a 
similar assertion as Chiu, and some even mock this assertion,48 
should have signaled to U.S.-based international law scholars 
(especially those with Chinese proficiency or those with 
sufficient resources to hire assistants with Chinese proficiency) 
that greater scrutiny was warranted.  The following part 
analyzes and evaluates Zhou’s International Law in detail. 
 
III.  Zhou Gengsheng’s International Law 
 
Zhou Gengsheng’s 1976 book International Law, which 
essentially took the format of a treatise, covered many of the 
main topics the market has come to expect of international law 
textbooks. These topics include the concept and origin of 
international law, the relationship between domestic and 
international law, international legal personality and statehood, 
state responsibility, state jurisdiction, residents, territory, 
diplomatic relations, treaty law, international organizations, 
international dispute settlement, and the International Court of 
Justice.49  The fact that 1981 and 2007 versions of this treatise 
were created, the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs uses the 
2007 version,50 and it still is in circulation attests to the overall 
quality of International Law.  Obvious gaps in coverage include 
international human rights law, international criminal law, 
international humanitarian law and a few others, although that 
might be expected of such a treatise from this period, when many 
Western and socialist scholars alike saw little use of war-time 
laws following the atrocities of the Second World War.51  Chen 
Tiqiang asserts that Zhou did not intentionally leave out war-
 
48.  See YU MINYOU & LIU HENG, THE DIRECTION OF DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CHINA [论国际法在中国的发展走向] 5 (2010); WUHAN 
UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL SCIENCE [武汉大学学报:哲学社会
科学版] 705–22 (2010). 
49.  See ZHOU, supra note 34; About Us, COMMERCIAL PRESS, 
www.commercialpress.com.hk/ww/aboutus.html (last visited June 10, 2019). 
50.  See United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, References and 
Resources, www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_064resrefE.pdf (last 
visited June 10, 2019). 
51.  See Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 241. 
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time laws from this book, but rather he died before these parts 
could be completed,52 which seems questionable.  Nevertheless, 
each chapter started with a recitation of the general principles, 
which showed mastery of each topic, thus satisfying the 
knowledge requirement of scholarship, and then provided a 
strong evaluation of those principles from the PRC or socialist 
perspective, including relevant examples, which showed clear 
mastery of the PRC’s policies at that time. 
Hungdah Chiu and Samuel Kim would appear to downplay 
the significance of this book by asserting that Zhou relied too 
heavily on the eighth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law, 
both in structure and in substance.53  With the structure, there 
admittedly are considerable similarities in the chapter titles 
alone, even though the eighth edition of Volume 1 relating to 
peace has sixteen chapters, and Zhou’s book has twelve.54  
However, such similarities are too superficial a basis for 
downplaying the significance of Zhou’s book.  After all, most 
textbooks from this period shared similarities in their tables of 
contents,55 presumably for the obvious reason that international 
 
52.  See id. at 241–42. 
53.  See Chiu Book Review, supra note 38, at 978 (“The organization of the 
book is primarily based on Oppenheim’s treatise on international law . . . 
.  Reliance on Oppenheim poses some problems, because by the time the author 
completed the manuscript, Lauterpacht’s Oppenheim was 9 years old and did 
not totally reflect some important subsequent developments in international 
law.”); Kim, supra note 3, at 142; see also Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 242. 
54.  Zhou’s book does not address any of the topics found in Volume 2 of 
Oppenheim’s International Law, which relates to war.  See Tiqiang, supra note 
35, at 241–42. 
55.  See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW vii–xix (3d ed. 1979); D.J. LATHAM BROWN, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW vii–
ix (1970); D.P. O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW v–xxiii (1970); J.G. STARKE, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW xi–xiv (8th ed. 1977) (although including 
the law relating to war and neutrality); see also WOLFGANG G. FRIEDMANN ET 
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW xv-xvi (Jesse H. Choper et 
al. 1969) (adding use of force); L.C. GREEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE 
CASES vii–xiii (4th ed. 1978) (adding international criminal law, international 
torts and the law of armed conflict, among others); D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW vii-ix (1979) (adding use of force); MANUAL 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW v-vi (Max Sørensen ed., 1968) (same); WERNER 
LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION vii (1979) 
(same); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW viii–xv (6th ed.1976) (adding the law of armed conflict and a nuclear-age 
context); RICHARD N. SWIFT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT AND CLASSIC ix–xi 
(1969) (adding use of force).  For a good example of how non-Western textbooks 
15
ARTICLE 10_FRY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:47 PM 
1006 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.2 
law involves a relatively standard set of topics relating to the 
rules involving the interaction of subjects of international law.  
As Chen Tiqiang pointed out about Zhou’s book, it “was written 
more or less following the conventional system in the 
arrangement of its chapters . . .,”56 and this appears to be an 
overwhelmingly accurate assessment. 
When it comes to the substance, while Oppenheim’s 
International Law influenced Zhou, these are two entirely 
different books.  For example, Oppenheim’s book and Zhou’s 
book adopt completely different fundamental ideologies, as well 
as different views on many aspects of international law.  These 
differences are highlighted throughout this Article, although 
such comparisons are illustrative, not exhaustive.  As the 
Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (“CPIFA”) notes in 
the preface of its 1954 translation of the seventh edition of 
Oppenheim’s International Law, the book reflects the 
imperialist and capitalist approach to international law,57 
whereas Zhou’s book largely, but not always, was in line with 
the PRC’s policies at that time, as explained throughout this 
part.  Even if Zhou’s book was perfectly in line with PRC policies 
at that time or only cited publicly accessible government sources, 
it is not a valid basis for downplaying the significance of the 
book, as Hungdah Chiu did,58 because many Western 
international law textbooks and treatises at the time were in 
line with their home government’s policies and cited publicly 
accessible government sources, including Oppenheim’s 
International Law.59  Moreover, the perspective in Oppenheim’s 
International Law and Zhou’s book differ dramatically on a host 
 
at this time were broader than the normal Western textbook on international 
law, see R.C. HINGORANI, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW xi–xii (1979) (adding 
chapters on airspace, terrorism, espionage and war-related chapters, among 
many others); see also Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 241 (“The book was written 
more or less following the conventional system in the arrangements of its 
chapters . . . .”). 
56.  Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 241. 
57.  See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW [奥本海国际法] i–ii (Chinese 
People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs trans., 7th ed. 1954) [hereinafter 
Oppenheim’s International Law in Chinese]. 
58.  See Chiu Book Review, supra note 38, at 978 
59.  See, e.g., LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 200, 
204, 281, 336, 651–52, 663, 675, 690–91, 698, 700 (Hersch Lauterpacht, 
ed., 8th ed. 1955). 
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of specific points, as shown throughout this Article.  For 
example, CPIFA interpreted the seventh edition of Oppenheim’s 
International Law as viewing Tibet as a quasi-sovereign state 
and that it was just for states to intervene in other states’ affairs 
to protect their overseas nationals, just as the United States 
intervened in Cuba n 1906 and the United Kingdom intervened 
in China in 1927, which CPIFA and the PRC rejected.60  These 
types of ideological and specific differences make it hard to see 
any meaningful similarities between these books beyond the 
relatively superficial ordering of a few of the chapters and Zhou’s 
engagement with Oppenheim’s assertions.  Finally, it must be 
noted that it was not uncommon for Western international law 
textbooks at that time to be influenced heavily by Oppenheim’s 
International Law,61 presumably because it was the best, most 
comprehensive textbook on the market at that time.  Such 
influence has not stopped those works from being considered as 
scholarly, so why should it with Zhou’s book? 
Zhou’s consistency with PRC policies and criticism of U.S. 
and other imperialist policies concerning international law 
would be expected of a product from this time period.  In 
particular, Zhou emphasized the PRC’s position as the rightful 
heir to China (as opposed to the Republic of China, or Taiwan), 
the peaceful nature of socialist states that opposes imperialism 
and supports liberation of previously colonized states 
everywhere (especially in Asia and Africa), and the importance 
of the peaceful resolution of disputes through negotiation (not 
through force), as explained below.  As shown throughout this 
Article, these points are in line with PRC policies at that time.62  
 
60.  See Oppenheim’s International Law in Chinese, supra note 57, at 208, 
239, 244. 
61.  See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 55 (citing OPPENHEIM, supra note 59); 
SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 55, at 163, 336, 411, 463, 475, 539 
(6th ed. 1976); Benedict Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: 
International Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive 
International Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 401 (2002) (discussing the overwhelming 
influence of Oppenheim on international lawyers since the beginning of the 
20th century); Martin V. Totaro, Legal Positivism, Constructivism, and 
International Human Rights Law: The Case of Participatory Development, 48 
VA. J. INT’L L. 719, 726–27 (2008) (same). 
62.  See Deng Xiaoping, The Speech of Deng Xiaoping (Vice Prime 
Minister) in the 6th special meeting of General Assembly of the United Nation 
at 1974 [邓小平1974年联合国代表大会发言], PEOPLE [人], 
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Given this similarity with the PRC’s position, it may at first 
seem surprising that Commercial Press felt obliged to add the 
preface to the 1976 version that warned readers of the Western 
influence that Zhou’s book exhibited.  However, upon closer 
inspection, it becomes easy to see what the PRC government and 
Commercial Press would have been worried about concerning 
Zhou’s treatise—for example, Zhou’s characterization as custom 
the practice of pre-maturely recognizing states in Chapter 
Three. Therefore, while critics might challenge the 
characterization of Zhou’s treatise as scholarly based on an 
apparent lack of independence due to toeing the party line in 
many instances, so to speak, these sorts of divergences from PRC 
policy strengthen the perceived independence of this work. 
Chinese international law scholars have recognized the 
scholarly contribution of Zhou’s book.  For example, Chen 
Tiqiang succinctly summarized this work in the following 
manner: 
 
International Law, the most voluminous and 
erudite work of [Zhou’s], was completed by Prof. 
Zhou at the age of 80 when his health was failing, 
and especially when his eye-sight was weakening. 
With an astonishing will power, Prof. Zhou wrote 
this 600,000-character book which is rich in 
information and extensive documentation. It has 
a powerful logic, well-knit structure and great 
succinctness. His immense knowledge and great 
seriousness in academic pursuit are worth 





visited June 10, 2019); see also 
The Declaration of People’s Republic of China in the World Conference to 
Defend Peace [中国保卫世界和平大会宣言], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Oct. 4, 
1949; Jing Lu, The Style of Peace Diplomacy of People’s Republic of China [中
国和平外交的风格与气派], CPC NEWS [中国共产党新闻网], Aug. 2, 2017, 
http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0802/c40531-29443820.html (last visited 
at June 10, 2019); The Geneva Conference is Inaugurated! [日内瓦会议开幕了], 
PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Apr. 29, 1954. 
63.  Tiqiang, supra note 35, at 241. 
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Here, Chen Tiqiang seems to be making the case for why Zhou’s 
work was scholarly, essentially a similar definition as the one 
this Article adopts, as outlined in the introductory part above, 
and this Article would agree with Chen’s assessment.  
Combining the knowledge, independence and originality that is 
apparent throughout, especially his apt selection of examples to 
support his assertions, this book constitutes the clearest 
example of scholarly work during the period between 1965 and 
1979. 
 
1.  Introductory Chapter 
 
Starting with his introduction to international law, Zhou 
provided an interesting comparison of Western and socialist 
approaches to international law, quoting from such sources as 
Oppenheim as well as the accepted Soviet definition, criticizing 
the former for its formalism and praising the latter for 
promoting peace through collective security.64  This point was in 
line with PRC policies at that time.65  Zhou then identified four 
features of international law: (1) internationality, which 
emphasized formation through consent between states and 
excluded individuals as subjects; (2) legality, which excluded 
non-legal norms like comity from its scope and recognized 
difficulties in enforceability; (3) generality, which required the 
binding of all states to a particular norm; and (4) classism, which 
required law to serve politics.66  This last point was particularly 
in line with PRC policies at that time.67  Zhou took issue with 
the notion that international law was a European creation 
because states during the times of ancient China adopted rules 
and customs, although he showed a large measure of objectivity 
and independence by admitting that international law generally 
was a product of Europe in that international law did not gain 
 
64.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 1–3. 
65.  See MINYOU & HENG, supra note 48; WUHAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF 
PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL SCIENCE, supra note 48, at 705–22. 
66.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 3–8. 
67.  See Jianming Du, Re-understand the Class Nature of Law [重新认识
法的阶级性], 2010 J. JILIN NORMAL UNIV. [吉林师范大学学报:人文社会科学版] 
72–74 (2010); Yaohai Wang, The Ten Principles of Marxist Jurisprudence [马
克思主义法学的十大原理], 1 SOC. SCI. HEILONGJIANG [黑龙江社会科学], 103–10 
(2016). 
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influence over international relations until after the 1684 Peace 
of Westphalia.68  International law became less of a European 
phenomenon as more colonies in North and South America 
gained independence in the 19th century and Western values 
spread to Eastern states.69  This Western influence ultimately 
led to Asian states—namely, China, Japan, Thailand and 
Korea—being forced to conclude unequal treaties with Western 
states and Africa being carved up by colonial powers in search of 
terra nullius, thereby subjecting these regions to imperialist 
forms of international law.70  Zhou heralded the 1917 
Communist Revolution as introducing a new form of 
international law that promoted peace by prohibiting territorial 
seizure by force, inter alia.71  According to Zhou, collaboration 
between socialist and capitalist states enabled the conclusion of 
the UN Charter, which instrument embodied socialist norms 
such as respecting people’s equal rights, the principle of self-
determination, and the non-intervention principle that 
emphasizes state sovereignty.72  These two points are in line 
with PRC policies at that time.73  The first point about the 
prohibition of territorial seizure by force is interesting, as one 
would have expected Zhou to point to the end of class struggle or 
the elevation of the proletariat or peasant leading to peace.74  
Zhou seems to have seen such an assertion as impossible 
because class struggle within international law continued 
during the UN era, with the socialist approach promoting the 
people’s interests and the capitalist approach promoting 
capitalists’ interests.75  Other Chinese commentators during this 
time shared this same view of the biases of international law.76  
 
68.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 39–42. 
69.  See id. at 43–51. 
70.  See id. at 50–51. 
71.  See id. at 51–53. 
72.  See id. at 53–54. 
73.  See Resist Aggression, Peaceful Coexistence [反抗侵略，和平共处], 
PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Apr. 4, 1955; Xiaoping, supra note 62. 
74.  See 2 Sources of Chinese Tradition 346–47, 407–09 (William Theodore 
de Bary & Irene Bloom eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
75.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 55. 
76.  See Xixiang Song, About the Class Nature of International Law [关于
国际法的阶级性], 1986 Shanghai Univ. J. [上海大学学报：社会科学版] 103–05 
(1986); Naibin Xu, Discussing the Definition of International Law [谈谈国际法
的定义], 1984 NW. UNIV. POLI. L.J. [西北政法学院学报] 79 (1984). 
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All of these commentators essentially downplayed the strides 
that labor and economic development had made on the 
international level since the end of the First World War and 
their impact on (or rather perceived impact on) peace.77  
Concerning the point about collaboration between capitalist and 
socialist states leading to the conclusion of the UN Charter, this 
is noticeably different from the standard Western explanation of 
how the UN Charter was concluded, which portrays the Soviet 
representatives as disagreeable and the Chinese representatives 
as not being particularly socialist.78 
Again, critics might point to such descriptions of 
international law by Zhou as reflecting a lack of independence, 
given their strong socialist tint.  However, such descriptions 
demonstrate a somewhat sophisticated understanding of the 
autopoetic nature of international law that allows for different 
interpretations of international law, which was present in the 
Western literature at this time.79  This stands in stark contrast 
to Chiu’s approach to international law, for example, which 
seemed to see valid approaches to international law as requiring 
confirmation from “the writings of Western international law 
scholars,”80 which is reflected neither in the mainstream 
literature on international law nor in actual practice. 
 
2.   Main Participants of International Law 
 
In Chapter Two on the main participants of International 
Law, Zhou stressed the focus on states and downplayed the role 
of international organizations and individuals to being targets 
of enforcement of international law because their rights derive 
from treaties between states.81  Zhou saw any effort to elevate 
international organizations to the status of subjects of 
 
77.  See generally DANIEL G. PARTAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (1965); WIL 
D. VERWEY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972). 
78.  See, e.g., STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS ch. 7 (2003). 
79.  See D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 52–53 (2d ed. 1976). 
80.  Hungdah Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist 
Chinese Views of Unequal Treaties, in CHINA’S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES 239, 267 (Jerome A. Cohen ed., 1972).  
81.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 61–64. 
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international law as an effort by capitalist states who control 
those international organizations to increase their power.82  
Moreover, Zhou opposed partial enjoyment of sovereignty by 
other non-state entities on account of the belief that they 
struggle under colonialism.83  This point was in line with PRC 
policy at that time.84  Zhou emphasized that Tibet is an 
autonomous region in the PRC, not a sovereign state, a half-
sovereign state or colony.85  Zhou also spent some time 
discussing the status of the Vatican in concluding that it is not 
a state and not a participant in international law,86 which 
presumably was to justify the PRC’s lack of diplomatic relations 
with the Vatican. 
 
a. Concept of a State 
 
Concerning the concept of a state under international law, 
Zhou asserted that any attempt to suggest there are “two 
Chinas” undermines Chinese sovereignty, which is against 
international law.87  This point was in line with PRC policies at 
that time.88  He asserted that a local government of a country 
cannot constitute a state, and so any local government, unless 
otherwise authorized by the state, cannot engage in foreign 
relations.89  For example, when Tibet sent its so-called diplomats 
overseas in 1950, the Chinese government immediately denied 
that it had sent any diplomats.90  Zhou identified a significant 
exception—that a nation that is fighting for independence, 
building its own country, and developing its own political 
organizations, even if overseas, can be treated as a sovereign 
 
82.  See id. at 67–70. 
83.  See id. at 75–77. 
84.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs Intensely Remonstrates that India 
Intervened the Domestic Issues of People’s Republic of China [我外交部强烈抗议
印度干涉中国内政], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Jan. 3, 1966 [hereinafter 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs]; China Asks for Nothing, supra note 24. 
85.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 76–77. 
86.  See id. at 101–03. 
87.  See id. at 60. 
88.  See China Asks for Nothing, supra note 24. 
89.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 60. 
90.  See id. at 60–61. 
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state.91  This appears to have been roughly in line with Western 
approaches to international law at that time, which saw a 
blurred line between states and entities struggling for such 
status.92  While Oppenheim’s International Law generally 
agrees with the general Western approach, it nevertheless 
emphasizes the objective nature of state recognition and 
requires a distinction to be made between insurgents that 
constitute a belligerent power and insurgents that constitute a 
state.93  This would seem to go against how Zhou portrayed 
international law on this point because he did not mention 
liberation from colonialism.  It has been particularly difficult to 
find evidence showing whether Zhou’s assertion was in line with 
PRC policies at that time.  On the one hand, if this assertion was 
referring to the case of Taiwan, the PRC obviously could not 
support the position that Taiwan could be treated as a sovereign 
state even though Chiang Kai-shek had developed Taiwan’s own 
political organizations.  On the other hand, PRC leaders at that 
time generally had expressed support for ex-colonial states in 
their fight for independence.  No readily available evidence for 
this latter point could be found.  Therefore, it must be concluded 
that Zhou’s assertion here falls within a gray area of PRC policy. 
The main point that Zhou made with participation in 
international law is that an individual cannot be directly 
involved in international law.94  States, instead of individuals, 
are the main participants of international law.95  Therefore, 
international law regulates acts of states, not acts of 
individuals.96  Zhou pointed out that all the rights an individual 
is entitled to under international law are not international 
 
91.  See id. at 61. 
92.  See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 80–82; STARKE, supra note 55, 
at 149–57 (focusing on the political elements of state recognition); see also 
JAMES R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 257–63 
(1979) (placing the emphasis on whether the struggling entity can be seen as 
a self-determination unit). 
93.  See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 127–29; see also HARRIS, supra note 
55, at 671–72 (recognizing an exception on the prohibition of intervention 
where insurgents are fighting for national liberation in the decolonization 
context); STARKE, supra note 55, at 174–77 (but focusing on this in the context 
of recognizing a belligerent as a government, not as a state). 
94.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 62. 
95.  See id. 
96.  See id.  
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rights per se.97  Instead, they are the rights conferred by national 
laws as a result of an implementation of international law.98  
Zhou identified several examples that Western jurists provide to 
show that individuals have a role in international law: (1) 
sanctioning individuals for war crimes and piracy; (2) protection 
of individual rights, such as protecting minorities; and (3) 
individuals can bring claims against a state in an arbitral 
tribunal under Section 297 of the Versailles Treaty.99  Zhou 
asserted that these, in fact, still are a state’s international rights 
and duties because they are created by inter-state treaties.100  
Individuals simply are the targets of implementation.  With 
regard to sanctioning, war criminals and pirates simply are the 
targets of punishment; they are sanctioned according to inter-
state treaties.101  As for individuals bringing claims against 
states, compensation is made to the state that the individual 
belongs to, rather than to the individual directly, and so the 
dispute actually is between the states, not the individual and a 
state.102 
Zhou emphasized that international organizations are not 
included among the main participants of international law.103  
For example, while the United Nations has the function of 
peacekeeping and other important international duties, this 
does not mean that it is a main participant in international 
law.104  This is because the United Nations is made up of member 
states, and the organization itself lacks sovereignty.105  Zhou 
dismissed arguments that international organizations are main 
participants as attempts to amplify the powers of the United 
Nations in order to undermine state sovereignty, which is 




97.  See id.  
98.  See id.  
99.  See id. at 67. 
100.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 67. 
101.  See id. at 68. 
102.  See id. at 69. 
103.  See id. 
104.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 69. 
105.  See id. at 70. 
106.  See id. 
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b. Concept of Sovereignty 
 
When it comes to sovereignty, Zhou explained that it cannot 
be divided into internal and external sovereignty, as some 
Western scholars are inclined to do in promoting imperialism 
and colonialism.107  In particular, a vassal state essentially is 
created when its internal sovereignty is acknowledged, but its 
external sovereignty is denied.108 
Zhou asserted that all states have both types of sovereignty, 
which are two concepts that cannot be divided.109  Even for half-
sovereign states, their sovereignty still exists, and unless they 
fundamentally cease to exist, they have the right to get rid of the 
external control and regain full sovereignty at any time.110  In a 
unitary state, there is only one centralized authority that 
represents the entire country.111  Even in a remote area in a 
unitary state, there can be an autonomous region under the 
state’s law, but such a region cannot be seen as a state under 
international law.112  These two points were in line with PRC 
policies at that time.113  The first point seems more like a 
tautology than an assertion of international law.  The second 
point appears to be in line with Western approaches to 
international law at that time, inasmuch as federal states and 
confederations were seen as a certain type of state under 
international law.114  Zhou took issue with Oppenheim’s 
International Law listing of Tibet as one of the “half-sovereign 
states,”115 which Zhou claimed was evidence of a British 
imperialist deliberately trying to complicate the facts.116  
However, Oppenheim’s International Law appears to be an 
exception among the international law textbooks from this 
period concerning this point. 
 
107.  See id. at 74–75. 
108.  See id. at 75. 
109.  See id. at 75–76. 
110.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 75–76. 
111.  See id. at 76. 
112.  See id. 
113.  See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 84; China Asks for 
Nothing, supra note 24. 
114.  See, e.g., STARKE, supra note 55, at 129–30. 
115.  OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 257–58. 
116.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 76–77. 
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Zhou spent a considerable amount of space arguing that the 
Vatican is not a state, and so it is not a participant in 
international law.117  Even though the Pope possessed territory, 
he lost this territory by 1870 when the Vatican was integrated 
with Italy.118  Therefore, the Pope is no longer a head of state.119  
Although Italy has passed the Law of Papal Guarantees to 
preserve the Pope’s status, this is in fact national law.120  
However, the situation changed after the Lateran Treaty in 
1929, which to a certain extent reinstated the Vatican’s status 
as a state.121  However, it should be noted that the Lateran 
Treaty stipulated that the Vatican is only responsible for 
religious affairs and would not take part in international 
affairs.122  Furthermore, the Vatican does not have sufficient 
territory and people to gain statehood, and so it is not a 
participant of international law.123 
 
3. State Recognition 
 
With regard to state recognition in Chapter Three, Zhou 
accentuated the need for colonies to gain independence before 
they can be recognized as states, contrary to how the United 
States and Japan had prematurely recognized states following 
expansion by force.124  Zhou noted how the PRC was the rightful 
heir to China, both within the United Nations and elsewhere 
internationally, and so the PRC should not have to apply for UN 
membership or otherwise sue for ownership of Chinese 
properties and assets.125  This Chapter, along with Chapter 
Four, essentially depicted how the PRC viewed its international 
status and how the PRC conducted its diplomatic affairs.  First, 
Zhou pointed out that the PRC only recognized those states that 
gained independence from colonial liberation and would never 
 
117.  See id. at 101–03. 
118.  See id. 
119.  See id. 
120.  See id. 
121.  See id. 
122.  See ZHOU, supra note 34. 
123.  See id. 
124.  See id. at 109–12. 
125.  See id. at 158–60. 
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recognize a state prematurely, thereby criticizing the United 
States and Japan for prematurely or inappropriately refusing to 
recognize the Soviet Union and the PRC for political reason and 
recognizing Manchuria, respectively.  This point appears to have 
been in line with PRC policies at that time.126 
With regard to the unfair treaties previously entered into 
between China, the Qing government, the Republic of China and 
other foreign entities, Zhou explained how the PRC adopted a 
piecemeal approach towards each treaty.  However, Zhou 
asserted that the validity of all those treaties would be subject 
to the PRC’s acknowledgement of those treaties as being valid. 
As for succession, the PRC deemed itself the rightful heir to 
China, both within the United Nations and internationally.  
Especially with regard to the PRC’s position within the United 
Nations, Zhou argued that this is an issue of reinstating the 
PRC’s position as the representative of China rather than 
reviewing whether to allow the PRC to join as a new member 
state.  This argument, of course, enabled the PRC to benefit from 
the unique status of the Republic of China in the United Nations 
previously, especially as one of the founding members and one 
of the five permanent members of the Security Council.  Zhou 
further condemned the United States for disrupting the PRC’s 
return to the United Nations.  Zhou revisited these sorts of 
issues in Chapter Ten. 
 
a. Comparisons of State Recognition 
 
Zhou started out his discussion of state recognition by 
challenging the customary international law of “pre-maturely 
recognizing a new country that may offend the integrity of the 
sovereign state and is illegal interference.”127  Zhou gave an 
example of when the United States recognized Panama’s 
independence in 1903.128  There also are existing territories that 
are occupied by foreign forces where a puppet state has been 
created.129  Those puppet states must not be recognized, as it 
 
126.  See China Asks for Nothing, supra note 24; Xiaoping, supra note 62. 
127.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 110. 
128.  See id. 
129.  See id. 
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illegally would undermine a state’s sovereignty.130  Zhou pointed 
to Manchuria as an example.  Manchuria was a puppet state 
when it was under Japanese invasion, and its establishment was 
entirely orchestrated by Japanese troops and officials who were 
not part of a genuine independence movement.131  Manchuria 
was not supported by the Chinese people and was merely a tool 
of the Japanese government, so it lacked independence, 
autonomous will, stability and continuity—all of which are 
needed for statehood.132 
Zhou compared and contrasted the actions of the PRC and 
the United States towards emerging states.  For example, he 
observed how the PRC had been supportive towards states that 
emerged from colonial liberation, such as Algeria, Yemen and 
Syria.133  This point was in line with PRC policies at that time.134  
However, Zhou’s assertion would appear to be inconsistent with 
what he wrote earlier in Chapter Two of the book—that a nation 
fighting for independence can be treated as a sovereign state—
because presumably states can gain independence through 
contexts other than colonial liberation.  As mentioned above, 
states typically have discretion in deciding which entities they 
recognize as states, within certain limitations.  Zhou focused on 
the practice of the United States, which, as an imperialist state, 
usually used non-recognition or recognition dependent on 
certain conditions in order to achieve its diplomatic goals of 
intervening in other states’ affairs.135  Zhou pointed out how the 
U.S. government refused to recognize the Soviet Union and the 
PRC, thereby defying the people’s right to choose their 
government and the principle of non-intervention.136  Zhou’s 
description of this as custom seems like a significant concession, 
which likely was unintentional, as it was shockingly far from the 
PRC’s official policy.137  At most, it shows his independence, or 
 
130.  See id. 
131.  See id. at 110–11. 
132.  See id. 
133.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 112. 
134.  See generally Xiaoping, supra note 62. 
135.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 128. 
136.  See id. 
137.  See Celebrate that the Right of the People’s Republic of China in the 
United Nations has been Resumed [庆祝我国恢复在联合国的合法权利], PEOPLE’S 
DAILY [人民日报], Oct. 31, 1971; Chinese People Must Liberate Tibet [中国人民
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at a minimum a lack of careful censorship of Zhou’s work by the 
PRC government at that time.  Either way, this example 
supports the characterization of Zhou’s work as being scholarly 
in nature. 
 
b. Succession of a State 
 
Zhou asserted that the PRC, as a main participant of 
international law, is a continuation of China following its 
liberation, and not a new state.138  Nevertheless, the liabilities 
that China undertook before the PRC came into power should be 
treated in a different way because the PRC is no longer that half-
colonized state with its own history and social institutions.139  
Zhou was adamant that those liabilities that stemmed from 
unequal treaties from the past were unacceptable, and they 
must be dealt with separately.140  This point was in line with 
PRC policies at that time,141 and it was progressive in light of 
Western policies at that time. Indeed, only a few commentators 
discussed forgiveness of odious debts by former governments 
during that time period.142  Oppenheim’s International Law 
certainly was not one of them.  Only in the past two decades have 
states actually started to forgive odious debts,143 although it 
 
一定要解放西藏], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Sept. 7, 1949; Never Allow the 
Foreign Invaders Annex the Territory of the People’s Republic of China—Tibet 
[决不容许外国侵略者吞并中国的领土—西藏], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报] , Sept. 
3, 1949; Superstitious Beliefs, supra note 20; The Forum of Students from Tibet 
and Neimenggu [蒙藏学校师生分别座谈 斥英美印侵藏阴谋 藏族应与国内各民族
团结一致，在中共领导下，斗争到底！], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Sept. 6, 
1949. 
138.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 155. 
139.  See id. 
140.  See id. at 156. 
141.  See The People’s Republic of China Welcomes the Authentic Friendly-
Equal Diplomatic Relations [新中国欢迎真正友好平等的邦交], PEOPLE’S DAILY [
人民日报], Oct. 8, 1949 [hereinafter Authentic Friendly-Equal Diplomatic 
Relations]. 
142.  See, e.g., D.P. O’CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 187–89 
(1956); D.P. O’Connell, Independence and Problems of State Succession, in THE 
NEW NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 7, 26–30 (William V. 
O’Brien ed. 1965); Sarah Ludington & Mitu Gulati, A Convenient Untruth: 
Fact and Fantasy in the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 595 (2008) 
(discussing Alexander Sack’s work from the 1920s on odious debts). 
143.  See Sabine Michalowski & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Ius Cogens, 
Transitional Justice and Other Trends of the Debate on Odious Debts: A 
29
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presumably was not unusual to have a debtor state come up with 
that argument during any period of time.  Zhou described the 
approach that the PRC took towards old treaties in the following 
manner: the PRC does not think that the old treaties continue 
to be valid or invalid, but rather that treaty obligations of the 
PRC and the Republic of China must be viewed separately.144  
Before the PRC acknowledges an old treaty, no foreign state can 
make a claim against the PRC based on that old treaty.145  In 
essence, Zhou seemed to be saying that the PRC is a new state 
with regard to China’s prior financial obligations, but it is not a 
new state for the purposes relating to the United Nations, for 
example. 
With regard to China’s representation at the United 
Nations, China is a founding member state and permanent 
member of the UN Security Council, so the PRC, as its successor, 
is the rightful heir to all these roles.146  The victory of the 
Communist Revolution evicted the Kuomintang, yet the 
Republic of China still retained the UN seat at that time, which 
represented a clear violation of the state succession principle, 
according to Zhou.147  Zhou asserted that the representation of 
the PRC in the UN is not an issue of a new country joining the 
United Nations, but rather a matter of reinstating the rights and 
status of China as a founding member state.148  This point was 
in line with PRC policies at that time.149  The PRC is not a 
country that became independent from another state or an 
independent country that resulted from colonial liberation, so 
there should be no need to look at whether the United Nations 
accepts  the  PRC  as  a  new  member  state.150   The  PRC  also  
 
 
Response to the World Bank Discussion Paper on Odious Debts, 48 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 59, 60–62 (2008) (discussing the forgiveness of odious debts by 
the United States and Norway, among others). See generally Emily F. Mancina, 
Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: Resurrecting the Odious Debt Doctrine 
in International Law, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1239 (2004) (providing a 
modern normative argument for forgiveness of odious debts). 
144.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 157. 
145.  See id. 
146.  See id. 
147.  See id. 
148.  See id. at 158. 
149.  See China Asks for Nothing, supra note 24. 
150.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 159. 
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inherited all the property and assets previously owned by China 
before its liberation.151 
 
4. States’ Basic Rights and Duties 
 
Chapter Four continued on by discussing states’ basic rights 
and duties as embodied in the PRC’s Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence contained in the 1954 Agreement between the 
Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade 
and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India: 
 
1. mutual respect for each other’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, 
2. mutual non-aggression, 
3. mutual non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs, 
4. equality and mutual benefit, and 
5. peaceful co-existence.152 
 
Yet again, Zhou spent a considerable amount of energy 
comparing the PRC’s and imperialist approaches, emphasizing 
the PRC’s peaceful approach compared to the more aggressive, 
interfering Western approach.153  Zhou again quoted 
Oppenheim, this time in relation to his definition of 
intervention, and then he provided an interesting analysis of 
that definition, asserting that intervention is allowed by right 
and on humanitarian grounds.154  The notion of humanitarian 
intervention was relatively common in Western international 
law literature during this time, even though not all agreed with 
it being a valid basis for intervention.155  Interestingly, 
 
151.  See id. at 160. 
152.  Agreement (with Exchange of Notes) on Trade and Intercourse 
between Tibet Region of China and India, China-India, Apr. 29, 1954, 
1958 U.N.T.S. 4307, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20299/v299.pdf. 
153.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 189–90. 
154.  See id. at 190. 
155.  Compare Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND 
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (John Norton Moore ed. 1974), with 
Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a 
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Oppenheim’s International Law recognized the existence of the 
notion of humanitarian intervention while at the same time 
observing that the UN Charter “expressly rules out intervention 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of the States.”156  Therefore, it would appear that Zhou diverges 
dramatically from Oppenheim’s International Law on this point.  
Zhou elaborated that there were direct and indirect forms of 
intervention, with the former involving military force, 
propaganda and resolutions of international organizations, and 
the latter involving financial assistance, such as with the 
Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine.157  Zhou then 
emphasized the PRC’s commitment to non-intervention, in 
terms of interference both in other states’ affairs and in PRC 
affairs, citing Indian’s intervention in Tibet and the U.S. 
intervention in Taiwan as two examples.158  This point was in 
line with PRC policies at that time, although the earlier part 
about intervention being allowed on humanitarian grounds 
certainly was not in line with PRC policies,159 and it is 
inconsistent with what Zhou wrote later in the book.160  
Therefore, this would suggest either his views or the PRC’s 
policies (or both) concerning intervention were complex during 
this time period, or that he mistakenly said humanitarian 
intervention was allowed when he meant to assert that states 
often (improperly) rely on humanitarian grounds when they 
intervene.  Other commentators during this time period seem to 
have recognized the PRC’s approach to humanitarian 
intervention as being complex and dependent on the exact 
circumstances involved.161  However, in support of the latter 
 
Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN 
WORLD 229 (John Norton Moore ed. 1974).  See generally BRENDAN SIMMS & 
DAVID J.B. TRIM, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY (2011); FERNANDO 
R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 
(2d ed. 1996). 
156.  OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 312–13. 
157.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 190–91. 
158.  See id. at 192–93. 
159.  See Xiaoping, supra note 62; The U.S. Imperialism Takes the 
Advantages of the United Nations to Commit the Crime of Aggression [美帝国
主义利用联合国进行侵略的罪行], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Jan. 9, 1965. 
160.  See infra pt. III(6). 
161.  See Qi Zhang, The Changing China and Humanitarian Intervention 
[变革的中国与人道主义干预], 2015 CNKI [世界经济与政治: 世界政治] 103–112 
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view, Zhou went on to analyze the non-aggression principle 
established by the UN Charter and then observed the lack of 
commitment to this principle among imperialists, giving the 
example of U.S. aggression in Korea and Taiwan and ridiculing 
the UN accusations that the PRC could be an invader.162  Zhou 
distinguished PRC actions in Korea from U.S. actions by saying 
the PRC’s actions had involved countering military intervention 
and, therefore, was not military intervention per se.163  Zhou 
asserted that this was in line with the PRC’s non-aggression 
principle,164 which extended to territories of other countries, 
including where the Kuomintang is located.165  As already noted 
above, this last point seems so different from PRC policy at that 
time (and even now) that it arguably stands as the best evidence 
of Zhou’s independence, as careful censors surely would not have 
allowed such a significant concession. 
Moving on to equality and mutual benefit, Zhou analyzed 
unequal treaties and advocated for their cancellation in order to 
end the oppression and exploitation of Chinese people, instead 
insisting on reciprocity in accordance with international law.166  
Zhou identified how Western approaches to international law 
focus on equality in form, not in practice, which he deemed 
inadequate.167  He cited the example of the Sino-American 
Commercial Treaty of 1946 between the United States and the 
Kuomintang, which appeared on its face to be equal but 
ultimately was unequal due to the unequal economic power of 
the two parties at the time of negotiation that gave the United 




162.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 201–04. 
163.  See id. at 204–05. 
164.  See Xiaoping, supra note 62; Jing Wang, The People’s Republic of 
China’s Exploration in Peaceful Settlement of Taiwan Problem in the Early 
Years [建国初期中国政府为和平解决台湾问题所作的探索], 1994 BEIJING PARTY 
HIST. RES. CTR.  [北京党史研究] 21–27 (1994); Shizhu Zhu, Responding to the 
Changing Situation, Peace is the Most Precious [因应变局， 以和为贵], 1998 
HUAIYIN NORMAL UNIV. J. [淮阴师范学报] 30–33 (1998). 
165.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 205. 
166.  See id. at 213–14. 
167.  See id. at 214. 
168.  See id. 
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a. Jurisdiction 
 
Concerning jurisdiction, Zhou criticized the United States’ 
garrison policies in South Korea and Japan, which led to offences 
committed by garrison troops not punishable due to 
extraterritoriality.169  Zhou compared this with the Polish-Soviet 
Treaty of 1956 where the Soviet Garrison was under the 
jurisdiction of the Polish courts rather than enjoying 
extraterritoriality.170  Zhou further stated that it would be more 
reasonable for the foreign state to recognize the absolute 
jurisdiction of the state being garrisoned to preserve the 
territorial sovereignty of the state being garrisoned.171  He felt 
that having a garrison in a foreign state is abnormal, as it would 
harm the jurisdiction of the state being garrisoned, and such 
harm should be eliminated as soon as possible.172  The Chinese 
Volunteers in the Korean War withdrew in 1958, and yet U.S. 
troops have stayed in South Korea until now.173  This not only 
damages South Korea’s sovereignty, but also threatens other 
states, which is clearly unacceptable in contemporary 
international law.174  Of course, Zhou did not explore how South 
Korea’s consent to having the U.S. troops remain in South Korea 
impacts his assertion of damage to sovereignty. 
 
b. State Responsibility 
 
Concerning state responsibility, Zhou asserted that, while 
states enjoy rights, they also have a duty not to infringe other 
states’ enjoyment of their rights.175  This point was in line with 
PRC policies at that time,176 and reflected the mainstream, 
 
169.  See id. at 220–21. 
170.  See id. 
171.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 220–21. 
172.  See id. at 221. 
173.  See id. 
174.  See id. 
175.  See id. at 233. 
176.  See Xiaoping, supra note 62; Authentic Friendly-Equal Diplomatic 
Relations, supra note 141; see also Geneva Conference Continued to Discuss the 
Korea Issues, Premier Zhou Enlai Made Important Speech and Supported the 
Unification of Korea [日内瓦会议继续讨论朝鲜问题 周恩来外长作重要发言 并支
持南日关于恢复朝鲜统一的建议], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Apr. 30, 1954. 
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/10
ARTICLE 10_FRY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:47 PM 
2019 MAO-ERA INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 1025 
state-centered approach to international law at that time as 
well.177  Oppenheim’s International Law shared these same 
mainstream views.178  A breach of this duty would be considered 
as international delinquency, which may trigger state 
responsibility,179 which again was reflected in the Western 
international law literature at that time.180  Oppenheim’s 
International Law also shared these views.181  Zhou 
acknowledged that the PRC would strongly protest and ask for 
a determination of state responsibility when the rights and 
interests of the PRC are infringed, especially when they are 
infringed by imperialist states.182 
For infringement on territorial integrity, the PRC had 
protested strongly the U.S. military intervention in Taiwan and 
had filed a complaint to the United Nations in 1950.183  In the 
same year, the PRC also protested against the U.S. infringement 
on the airspace of China during the Korean War.184  Two 
requests were made to the United States: (1) to punish the US 
Air Force for the atrocities it committed; and (2) to seek 
compensation for all losses suffered by the PRC.185  Another 
occasion where the PRC protested in order to defend its 
territorial integrity was when the PRC protested France’s 
invasion of Vietnam in 1950, especially since French troops 
occasionally took military actions at the borders between China 
and Vietnam, which caused casualties of Chinese troops and 
civilians.186 
For infringement on national dignity, the PRC protested 
against the Japanese Nobusuke Kishi government for insulting 
 
177.  See, e.g., STARKE, supra note 55, pt. 3 (entitled “Rights and Duties of 
States”); SWIFT, supra note 55, at 535–39 
178.  See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 259–61. 
179.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 233. 
180.  See, e.g., STARKE, supra note 55, at 330–31; see also Eduardo Jiménez 
de Aréchaga, International Responsibility, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 531, 540 (Max Sørensen ed., 1968). 
181.  See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 345–47. 
182.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 233. 
183.  See id. at 241–42. 
184.  See id. 
185.  See id. 
186.  See id. 
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the national flag of the PRC in Nagasaki, Japan.187  In addition, 
the PRC government also protested when the Vietnamese 
government forced the Chinese immigrants there to change 
nationality.188  All of these examples show Zhou’s determination 





 Chapter Five focuses on various aspects of how 
international law impacts residents of a state. Concerning 
nationality, Zhou noted how the PRC adopted the principle of jus 
sanguinis (or right of blood) when determining the nationality of 
a person, as opposed to the jus soli principle.189  This point was 
in line with PRC policies at that time,190 and it also was in line 
with Western international law textbooks at that time, although 
they used the Latin phrase but said the nationality was through 
the parents, not through blood per se.191  Similarly, Oppenheim’s 
International Law mentioned nationality by birth, but again it 
was not framed in terms of a right of blood per se.192  Some 
commentators see the acquiring of Chinese nationality by birth 
and by blood as separate.193  This distinction might suggest more 
of a racial element to China’s approach to nationality 
determinations, although more research on this point is needed.  
In any event, this point emphasizes a difference between 
Oppenheim’s International Law and Zhou’s book, even if small.  




187.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 242–43. 
188.  See id. 
189.  See id. at 265. 
190.  See Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和
国国籍法] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., effective 
Sep. 10, 1980) art. 4–5. 
191.  See, e.g., LEVI, supra note 55, at 150–51; SCHWARZENBERGER & 
BROWN, supra note 55, at 113. 
192.  See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 651–52. 
193.  See Ronald C. Brown, China’s Employment Discrimination Laws 
During Economic Transition, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 361, 386–87 (2006). 
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purposes, but also the female line,194 which was more 
progressive than that of Canada at that time, for example.195 
 On a foreigner’s entry and exit of a state, Zhou asserted 
that this is a matter entirely within a state’s sovereignty.196  A 
state may, for security or other legitimate reasons, refuse entry 
of a foreigner.197  Zhou asserted that, in practice, only people 
with mental illness, an infectious disease or a criminal record 
could be refused entry.198  Zhou emphasized that it would be an 
international problem if a state were to refuse entry of a person 
based on their race or nationality.199  Examples that Zhou gave 
involve past U.S. anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese immigration 
policies.200  Such race discrimination would harm the friendship 
between states, undermine the other’s national dignity and 
violate the equality principle.201  These points were in line with 
PRC policies at that time.202  These points were progressive in 
light of prior Western policies, which involved a right of states 
to deny foreigners access to their territory as well as to expel 
them from their territory, with some exceptions.203  This view 
was reflected in Oppenheim’s International Law.204  As with the 
fight of ex-colonies for independence, it is not clear from the 
available evidence what the PRC’s exact policy was on this 
particular point during this time.  There is no record indicating 
 
194.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 265. 
195.  See Karen Knop & Christine Chinkin, Remembering Chrystal 
MacMillian: Women’s Equality and Nationality in International Law, 22 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 523, 579–81 (2001) (citing, inter alia, Benner v. Canada (Secretary 
of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358). 
196.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 275–76. 
197.  See id. 
198.  See id. at 276. 
199.  See id. 
200.  See id. 
201.  See id. 
202.  See Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Frontier 
Inspection of Exit from or Entry Into the Country [中华人民共和国出境入境检查
条例], GAZETTE STATE COUNCIL PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA [中华人民共和国国务
院公报], Sept. 1, 1995 (effective); Frontier Inspection Regulation [边防检查条例
], Apr. 30, 1965 (ceasing to be effective). 
203.  See, e.g., DANIEL C. TURACK, THE PASSPORT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
233–34 (1972); BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 519; GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 3–83 
(1978). 
204.  See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 675–95. 
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that the PRC ever refused the entry of people of a certain race 
or nationality.  Moreover, following the PRC’s style of peaceful 
and friendly diplomacy, it can be surmised that the PRC would 
not refuse entry of a particular race.  Nevertheless, there is no 
clear and official declaration of the PRC stating that China 
would definitely not deny the entry of certain races.  Therefore, 
it is difficult to say whether Zhou’s assertion was in line with 
PRC policy. 
 Concerning extradition, Zhou observed that a consensus 
existed among capitalist states that political prisoners are not to 
be extradited.205  However, the Inter-American Convention of 
Extradition of 1933 gave a state that was requested to extradite 
the right to decide whether a certain prisoner is a political 
prisoner or not.206  Some states may then, for their own benefits, 
abuse the extradition law or distort the meaning of political 
offense.207  Zhou asserted that this is how imperialist states 
extradite political prisoners who fought for national liberation 
or otherwise protect their own criminals.208 
 
6.   Territory 
 
 This Chapter introduced various aspects of territory, 
including land, territorial waters, territorial seas and territorial 
airspace.  While Zhou analyzed all kinds of theories and 
reviewed the historical development of those theories in great 
detail, one proposition remains the same for all aspects of 
territory: no state’s territorial integrity should be undermined.  
Any intrusion to a country’s territory would be an issue of 
sovereignty and would be against international law.  This point 
was in line with PRC policies at that time.209  Zhou also gave 
examples to support his criticism of imperialist aggression, such 
 
205.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 311. 
206.  See id. 
207.  See id. 
208.  See id. 
209.  See The Warship of the United States Invaded Our Territorial Sea 
Twice, the People’s Republic of China Issued 356th Serious Warning [美国军舰
两次入侵中国领海，中国提出严重警告], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Jan. 11, 
1965; The Government of the People’s Republic of China Made Statement 
Severely Condemning that the US Imperialism Expanding the War [我国政府
发表声明强烈谴责美帝扩大战火], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Jan. 13, 1965. 
38https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/10
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as the Suez Canal and Panama Canal incidents.  In addition, 
Zhou interpreted the theories that the United States and other 
Western states adopted with regard to territory, such as the 3-
mile territorial sea rule and the freedom of the outer space, as 
strategic moves to restrict other states’ development. 
 
a. Theories of Territory 
 
Although a state is, under national law, not the proprietor 
of the land it rules, it is, under international law, both ruler and 
proprietor.210  Zhou thought that théorie du territoire object is 
incorrect because it does not recognize the ruler as the proprietor 
of land.211  Instead, the theory contends that the state only rules 
the people on the territory and not the territory itself.212  If a 
state only rules the people on the territory, it leaves open the 
question about those territories without people living on them.213 
Théorie du territoire-limite suggests that territory is the 
material boundary within which a state may exercise its 
powers.214  This is a negative way of looking at territory.215  In 
fact, according to Zhou, territory does not negatively limit the 
ambit of a state’s powers.216  A state can, according to 
international law, exercise powers outside of its territory.217  An 
example would include the ability of states to arrest pirates on 
the high seas,218 just as states also can exercise jurisdiction over 
their ships while they are on the high seas.219  This point was in 
line with PRC policies at that time,220 and it was in line with 
Western international law literature at that time as well.221 
 
210.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 322. 
211.  See id. at 321. 
212.  See id. 
213.  See id. 
214.  See id. at 322. 
215.  See id. 
216.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 322. 
217.  See id. 
218.  See id. 
219.  See id. 
220.  See The Statement of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the 
Territorial Sea [中华人民共和国政府关于领海的声明], LAW SCI. [法学], Sept. 4, 
1958 [hereinafter Territorial Sea]. 
221.  See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 55, at 104–06; BROWNLIE, supra note 
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Zhou then cited Hans Kensen’s théorie de la compétence, 
which says that territory falls within the ambit of states’ powers 
as defined by international law.222  This theory denies the 
concept of sovereignty of a state or proposes that international 
law is higher than sovereignty, which undermines the concept of 
sovereignty and which is consistent with Western, capitalist 
approaches to international law.223  Zhou emphasized how this 
theory even proposes that the territories of two or more states 
may overlap with each other, which he saw as essentially an 
excuse for imperialism and colonialism.224 
Concerning fictional parts of territory, or territoire fictif, 
warships or other ships on the high seas are the “floating parts” 
of a state’s territory, which Zhou saw as far-fetched and 
unacceptable inasmuch as one of the main features of territory 
is its fixed nature.225  Also, it is impossible for the water 
surrounding a ship to be the territory of the flag state of that 
ship.226  Nevertheless, Zhou acknowledged that territories of a 
state can be separated, such as East and West Pakistan.227  Some 
states can have a territory that is completely surrounded by 
territories of other countries, which is called an enclave.228  
States with coasts can have island territories, such as the many 
islands of the PRC, including Taiwan.229  This point was in line 
with PRC policies at that time.230 
Zhou took a step back and explored the social and political 
significance of territory,231 which was considerably original 
among international law commentaries at that time.  In its 
 
55, at 243-47; HARRIS, supra note 55, at 351–52; SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, 
supra note 55, at 75–76; STARKE, supra note 55, at 309–12; SWIFT, supra note 
55, at 202, 213–14.  
222.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 323. 
223.  See id. 
224.  See id. 
225.  See id. at 324. 
226.  See id. 
227.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 324. 
228.  See id. at 324–25. 
229.  See id. 
230.  See The Asian and African People Would Not Tolerate the Gun-Boat 
Policy of the US, the “Pioneer” in Myanmar Severely Condemned the US for 
Intervening in  China’s Internal Affairs [亚非人民不会容忍美国的”炮舰政策” 缅
甸”先锋报”谴责美国干涉中国内政], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Sept. 2, 1958. 
231.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 325–26. 
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social meaning, territory is the foundation of a state.232  A state’s 
territory is fixed, and residents of that state can exploit the 
resources on that territory in perpetuity.233  Therefore, territory 
is the foundation for the development of a state.234  In its political 
meaning, territory is where a state may freely exercise its 
powers, based on the exclusivity of territory.235  That means a 
state may independently exercise its powers within its territory 
without any impediment and may exclude any competition and 
interference from the outside.236  Therefore, a state may, in 
accordance with its people’s will, arrange state affairs and 
control the destination of the state.237  If, following the théorie de 
la compétence that states may only act in accordance with 
international law, then states may not exercise their powers 
freely on their territory.238  If territories can overlap, then 
territories lose their exclusivity, and so the théorie de la 
compétence clearly is wrong, as it removes the meaning of 
territory and it does not comply with international law.239  In 
fact, according to Zhou, states act on their territory according to 
their sovereignty, and they do not acquire authority from 
international law.240  As a result, states must not interfere with 
other states’ sovereignty over their own territories.241 
This law fits with the interests of states within their 
international relations.242  Nevertheless, states that have 
adopted a system of imperialism and colonialism never respect 
other states’ sovereignty and would make excuses to invade 
other states’ territories and destroy their completeness.243  Zhou 
sees this as the main cause for international disputes and wars 
that threaten world peace.244 
 
232.  See id. at 325. 
233.  See id. 
234.  See id. at 325–26. 
235.  See id. at 326. 
236.  See id. 
237.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 326. 
238.  See id. 
239.  See id. 
240.  See id. 
241.  See id. 
242.  See id. 
243.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 326. 
244.  See id. 
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b. Territorial Waters 
 
Zhou relied on a series of examples to explain the 
international law relating to territorial waters.  First, the Suez 
Canal used to be a neutral zone under the Convention of 
Constantinople Treaty of 1888, but it came under British control 
in 1914, and subsequently became a tool of British imperialism 
policy.245  In the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, the United 
Kingdom agreed to withdraw all of its troops from Egypt and 
recognized the Suez Canal as part of Egypt, but the treaty also 
stipulated that the Suez Canal would remain an important 
passage of the British Empire.246  In 1956, the Egyptian 
government privatized the Suez Canal and fought against the 
British and French armies, and Egypt was able to regain control 
and sovereignty over the Suez Canal with the help of peaceful 
states and peoples around the world.247 
Zhou’s next example was the Panama Canal.  He 
emphasized how the United States pushed for Panama’s 
Declaration of Independence in 1908, then recognized Panama 
as a state three days after the Declaration and quickly signed 
the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with Panama to allow the United 
States to use, possess and control the Canal.248  The Canal 
became neutral and open for other states to use in 1914.249  
However, Zhou pointed out that the United States violated the 
neutrality principle and equality principle by building 
strongholds near the Canal and waiving taxes for U.S. ships, all 
of which he saw as ignoring Panama’s sovereignty.250  The people 
of Panama opposed U.S. rule over the Canal, and they 
eventually demanded the United States to leave in 1964,251 with 
the Panamanian government eventually taking back 
management of the Canal.252  Zhou emphasized how the PRC 
showed support to the Egyptians in the Suez Crisis and the 
 
245.  See id. at 346–47. 
246.  See id. 
247.  See id. 
248.  See id. at 348–50. 
249.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 348–50. 
250.  See id.  
251.  See id. 
252.  See id. 
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Panamanian people in taking back control over the Canal in 
1956 and 1964, respectively.253 
 
c.     Territorial Sea 
 
Zhou recognized that different states have different limits 
on their territorial seas, such as Sweden and Norway with four 
miles, Spain and Portugal with six miles, Mexico with nine miles 
and Russia with twelve miles.254  Zhou cited Rousseau when 
asserting that international practice is that states may set this 
limit by their discretion.255  This point was in line with PRC 
policies at that time.256  Numerous Western international law 
commentators reflected this variety in approaches and 
indeterminacy with the breadth of territorial seas, and it is 
difficult to say that there was one established limit under 
customary international law at that time.257  In any event, 
Oppenheim’s International Law did not discuss these specific 
limits,258 presumably because it predated these other Western 
international law books by over a year, before the controversy 
had come to a head.  As with the Western commentators, Zhou 
noted that the United Kingdom and the United States insisted 
on the 3-mile limit rule, both in their national laws and in 
treaties.259  Both were opposed to other states having more than 
three miles, and they especially objected to the twelve-mile limit 
based on strategic and economic considerations.260  For example, 
when other states expand their territorial seas, the UK and U.S. 
fleets’ activities on the high seas are limited, especially when it 
 
253.  See id. at 350. 
254.  See id. at 358–59. 
255.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 358–59. 
256.  See Territorial Sea, supra note 220. 
257.  See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 191–99; HARRIS, supra note 
55, at 310–11; LEVI, supra note 55, at 137–38; SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, 
supra note 55, at 100–05 (6th ed. 1976); STARKE, supra note 55, at 226–31; 
SWIFT, supra note 55, at 263–69. But see BROWN, supra note 55, at 95 (“The 
extent of the territorial waters or territorial sea is decided by the power to 
which they belong, and varies from State to State”). 
258.  See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 69, 587–89. 
259.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 358–59. 
260.  See id. 
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comes to combating enemies’ submarines in wartime.261  They 
also see this twelve-mile rule as impeding the passing of 
commercial ships and airplanes, as well as harming their fishing 
efforts.262  Zhou observed that this imperialist strategy is evident 
from the recent Vienna Law of the Sea Conference.263 
Zhou explained that there are two schools of thought on the 
limits of territorial seas.264 The first is the three-mile-limit 
theory adopted by states with strong navies, such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom, as well as Germany and Japan 
in the past, which does not allow other states to freely expand 
their territorial seas.265  Another theory is Rousseau’s theory 
where all states have the right to set limits for their own 
territorial seas and that there is no set limit on the territorial 
seas,266 as already mentioned above.  Zhou emphasized that the 
three-mile limit previously adopted by China was never 
recognized since the establishment of the PRC.267  The PRC 
established its territorial sea system in 1958, which Zhou noted 
remained at a twelve-mile limit at the time of his writing.268  




Zhou asserted that the PRC firmly defends its airspace, 
indicating that foreign aircraft may not trespass into the PRC’s 
airspace without permission.270  As an example, Zhou pointed to 
how the PRC shot down a U.S. military aircraft that trespassed 
into the airspace over the northeast of China during the Korean  
 
 
261.  See id.  
262.  See id. 
263.  See id. 
264.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 359. 
265.  See id. 
266.  See id. 
267.  See id. at 380. 
268.  See id. 
269.  See The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of 
People’s Republic of China Ratified the Statement Concerning the Territorial 
Sea [我人大常委会批准我政府关于领海的声明], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Sept. 
5, 1958; Territorial Sea, supra note 220. 
270.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 405. 
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War, with the U.S. soldiers aboard the aircraft being convicted 
and imprisoned.271 
In addition to defending its airspace, Zhou highlighted how 
the PRC also built its civil aviation routes to foreign countries 
primarily through the Warsaw Convention of 1929, not the 
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944.272  
In particular, Zhou observed that the routes that the PRC 
developed with foreign states were based on reciprocity and were 
concluded through negotiation.273  This point was in line with 
PRC policies at that time.274  It was noticeably different from the 
effort at the time to bring about greater multilateral cooperation 
concerning aviation routes.275 
 
e.    Outer Space 
 
 Zhou stressed that the United States pretends to believe 
that outer space does not belong to any state but is common 
space for all states to use because the United States is more 
advanced in terms of space technology.276  Zhou believed that 
such a theory would allow the United States to unacceptably 
dominate outer space.277  The result of this is that the territorial 
airspace of other states is undermined or violated.278  From 
Zhou’s perspective, the correct view of outer space was that 
international law did not limit the height of a state’s territorial 
space, going out indefinitely into space.279  Therefore, until there 
is an international convention that regulates outer space, all 
countries should preserve their exclusive right to their 
territorial airspace, which includes outer space.280  It would 
appear that international law at that time had not yet settled 
the question of where territorial airspace ends and where outer 
 
271.  See id. 
272.  See id. 
273.  See id. 
274.  See Authentic Friendly-Equal Diplomatic Relations, supra note 141.  
275.  See generally H.A. WASSENBERGH, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR 
TRANSPORTATION LAW IN A NEW ERA (1976). 
276.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 413. 
277.  See id. 
278.  See id.  
279.  See id. 
280.  See id. 
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space begins,281 and so Zhou was not expressly going against 
established international law according to Western textbooks on 
this point. 
 
7.  Territory Continued 
 
 Zhou’s Chapter Seven continued with a detailed analysis of 
territory concerning boundaries.  In general, Zhou opposed the 
theory of natural boundaries on the basis that its ambiguity 
provided states with an excuse to expand their territories.  With 
regard to resolving boundary disputes, Zhou stated that the 
PRC’s method of resolving disputes is through peaceful 
negotiation, and he gave examples of some recently concluded 
treaties with the PRC’s neighbors.  Concerning the acquisition 
of land, Zhou emphasized various methods of land acquisition, 
including annexation, conquest, res nullius and cession.  
Interestingly, Zhou disagreed with all of these methods of 
territorial acquisition on the grounds of their illegality and 
unfairness.  Zhou strongly criticized all of these methods in this 





When setting a boundary or a frontier, Zhou asserted that 
the two states have discretion in deciding where to set the 
boundary.282  This point was in line with PRC policy at that 
time.283  Western international law commentators tend not to 
 
281.  See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 122 (recognizing unresolved 
issues concerning the outer limits of sovereignty); LEVI, supra note 55, at 136–
37 (recognizing as valid one theory (among others) that territorial airspace had 
an unlimited height, but also asking the question of how far upwards does a 
state’s territorial airspace extend, without answering the question); 
OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 517–18 (citing J.C. Cooper, High Altitude Flights 
and National Sovereignty, 4 INT’L L.Q. 411 (1951)) (recognizing same); STARKE, 
supra note 55, at 195–204 (recognizing same).  But see BROWN, supra note 55, 
at 93 (implying that the sovereign airspace is limited to the atmosphere); 
SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 55, at 76, 100 (implying the same). 
282.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 422. 
283.  See Boundary Treaty Between the People’s Republic of China and the 
President of the Union of Burma, CHINA-MYAN., Oct. 1, 1960, CIA-
RDP08C01297R000100190005-8, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/doc 
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specifically say that territorial boundaries were based on states 
using their discretion when deciding the boundary, although 
that can be implied from the discussion of boundaries, with the 
possible exception being when natural boundaries such as rivers 
change their location.284  Oppenheim’s International Law 
appears to follow this general approach in the international law 
literature.285  If two states are separated by a mountain, the 
boundary can be set at the ridge, the watershed or the foothill.286  
If the boundary is set at the foothill, the whole of the mountain 
will become territory of one of the states.287  For example, before 
British India created the McMahon Line, the boundary between 
Tibet and India was at the south foothill of the Himalayas, and 
so part of Chinese territory was illegally ceded by the McMahon 
Line.288 
Zhou noted that, in international relations, there is a theory 
of determining state boundaries by looking at natural 
boundaries, such as mountains or rivers.289  Zhou asserted that 
such a theory clearly would be a political one because it reflects 
expansionist policies.290  For example, in a meeting between the 
Chinese and Indian officials regarding the Sino-Indian Boarder 
Issue, India proposed to adopt the natural boundary theory, 
which would have enabled India’s expansionist policy.291 
 
b. Border Dispute Resolution 
 
Zhou pointed out that, since the establishment of the PRC, 
the PRC proposed to resolve border issues with its neighboring 
states through negotiation.292  For example, by the mid-1960s, 
the PRC had resolved its border disputes with Afghanistan, 
 
s/CIA-RDP08C01297R000100190005-8.pdf. 
284.  See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 55, at 94; BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 
127–28.  But see STARKE, supra note 55, at 217 (noting how boundaries can be 
“generally acknowledged without express declaration”). 
285.  See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 530–35. 
286.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 422. 
287.  See id. 
288.  See id. 
289.  See id. at 426. 
290.  See id. 
291.  See id. 
292.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 429. 
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Burma, Mongolia, Nepal and Pakistan through negotiated 
border treaties, with the exceptions of the Sino-Soviet border 
negotiation that still was on-going and the Sino-India border 
negotiation where India was refusing to negotiate.293 
 
c.     Acquisition of Territory 
 
Zhou analyzed various methods of acquiring territory.  
Starting with annexation, he pointed out that acquisition 
through the natural increase of land, such as a delta formed in 
a river or a new island that emerged from sea, is obviously 
legal.294  However, some annexations may be artificial, such as 
building a dam on a river or by the shore to expand the boundary 
of a country, which would be illegal if the consent of the state on 
the other side was not received.295  Such detailed analysis of this 
area of international law seems overwhelmingly original among 
commentaries at that time. 
Concerning terra nullius, Zhou noted that Western jurists 
generally regard this as a primitive way of acquiring territory.296  
He then asserted that it is entirely a political arrangement that 
enables or justifies acts of aggression by colonizing states.297  
Zhou speculated that this method of acquisition would become 
less common in the future as there was not much terra nullius 
left.298  Zhou did not state what territories still could be 
considered terra nullius. Regardless, Zhou concluded that this 
method of acquisition is illegal because it ignores the claims of 
the indigenous populations there, which leads to a violation of 
human rights and the principle of self-determination.299  This 
point was in line with PRC policies at that time.300  However, 
this went against Western international law textbooks from this 
time, which recognized territorial acquisition through discovery 
 
293.  See id. 
294.  See id. at 445–46. 
295.  See id. 
296.  See id. at 446–47.  
297.  See id. 
298.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 446–47. 
299.  See id. 
300.  See Superstitious Beliefs, supra note 20, at 1; Resist Aggression, 
Peaceful Coexistence, supra note 73. 
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as legal, as long as the discoverer showed evidence of actually 
taking possession and control of that territory.301  Oppenheim’s 
International Law is included among those textbooks.302  This 
does not necessarily mean that international law is not evolving 
or will not evolve in the direction of voiding prior instances of 
territorial acquisition through discovery.303 
When it comes to conquest, Zhou dismissed it as being an 
excuse for aggression and expansion.304  Zhou believed there was 
no legitimate reason to justify conquest.305  With cession, Zhou 
described it as an unconditional mandatory transfer of land, 
which typically happens through treaties that result from 
war.306  Zhou said that cession had been recognized as a 
legitimate way of acquiring territory under international law, 
although its legitimacy should be reconsidered.307  Zhou 
recognized that Article 2 of the UN Charter allows for cession of 
territory, so it would be legitimate even if that cession was a 
result of war.308  However, he asserted that there is disguised 
cession, which is a de facto form of cession that actually is an 
occupation.309  Such an arrangement would constitute an 
imperialist form of aggression.310  One cannot say that the 
original state loses sovereignty over this territory in such a 
situation.311  This point was in line with PRC policies at that 
time.312  Zhou gave the example of the PRC taking back its 
 
301.  See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 149–50; SWIFT, supra note 55, 
at 121–23 (but noting that discovery is of limited importance now because of 
the current lack of terra nullius). But see SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra 
note 55, at 97 (noting that discovery leads to an inchoate title). 
302.  See OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 558–59. 
303.  See generally Danielle C. Davis, Land in the Second Decade: The 
Evolution of Indigenous Property Rights and the Energy Industry in the United 
States and Brazil, 34 ENERGY L.J. 667 (2013); Kent McNeil, Self-Government 
and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title, 47 MCGILL L.J. 473 (2002). 
304.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 449–50. 
305.  See id. 
306.  See id. at 451–52. 
307.  See id. 
308.  See id. 
309.  See id. at 453–54. 
310.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 453–54. 
311.  See id. 
312.  See Authentic Friendly-Equal Diplomatic Relations, supra note 141; 
Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference [中
国人民政治协商会议共同纲领], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Sept. 30, 1949. 
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previously leased lands except for Kowloon in Hong Kong.313  In 
places like Panama, where the people demanded the return of 
territorial control to the original state, Zhou asserted that the 
state that engaged in the disguised cession would not be able to 
continue to occupy the territory in question, such as the Panama 
Canal.314  Zhou denigrated imperialist states’ efforts to create 
spheres of influence in order to create a connection to a piece of 
territory, especially in China, and concluded that such efforts 
cannot be justified.315 
Zhou interestingly observed that these methods of 
territorial acquisition came from Roman law relating to 
privatizing property, which reflects contemporary imperialist 
and colonialist sentiments.316  Contemporary international law 
now prohibits acquisition through conquest, and the 
completeness of a state’s territory must remain intact.317 
 
8.  The High Seas 
 
This chapter on the high seas essentially is descriptive in 
nature.  In it, Zhou provided a review of the legal history and the 
laws that concern the high seas.  Zhou did not express many 
opinions or otherwise criticize any particular legal principles, 
which was different from the prior chapters that contained much 
criticism.  Therefore, this Article moves on to more interesting 
analysis by Zhou. 
 
9.  Diplomatic Relations 
 
Chapter Nine on diplomatic relations essentially outlined 
the PRC policy at that time.  In particular, it set out the 
requirements for the PRC to build diplomatic relationships with 
other countries: (1) renounce relationships with the 
Kuomintang; and (2) adopt a friendly attitude towards the PRC.  
Diplomatic relations were to be formed through negotiation with 
 
313.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 453–54. 
314.  See id. 
315.  See id. at 455–56. 
316.  See id. at 456. 
317.  See id. 
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the PRC, based on the principles of equality, reciprocity and 
mutual respect of each other’s territory and sovereignty.  This 
Chapter also analyzed other unofficial forms of diplomatic 
relationships such as semi-diplomatic relationships and citizen 
diplomacy.  This point on renouncing relationships was in line 
with PRC policies at that time.318  These conditions for entering 
into diplomatic relations with the PRC seem reasonable, given 
the politics at the time. 
Zhou started by observing that diplomatic relationships 
between states can take various forms.319  The most common 
form is a formal and thorough diplomatic relationship, although 
there also are semi-diplomatic relationships that are mainly 
through civilians.320  For formal diplomatic relationships, the 
main characteristic is when both states send their diplomats to 
the other, and the relationship is based on sovereign equality 
and mutual consent.321  This basis for diplomatic relations seems 
well established in the Western literature on international law 
at that time, including Oppenheim’s International Law, 
although the connection between diplomatic relations and 
equality usually is not mentioned in the same section.322  Zhou 
observed that the PRC has its own way of commencing a 
diplomatic relationship with another country.  For example, 
there are certain conditions and procedures that must be 
satisfied, which are specified in the Common Program of The 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Article 56: 
 
All those foreign governments who renounce their 
relationships with the Kuomintang and adopt a 
friendly attitude towards the PRC may negotiate 
with the PRC government to establish diplomatic 
relationship,  on  the  basis  of  equality,  reciprocal  
 
 
318.  See Authentic Friendly-Equal Diplomatic Relations, supra note 141. 
319.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 506–07. 
320.  See id. 
321.  See id. 
322.  See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, supra note 59, at 22–23, 263–67; 
SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 55, at 52–53, 59–60; STARKE, supra 
note 55, at 122–29. But see BROWN, supra note 55, at 35–36 (1970) (making an 
express connection between diplomatic relations and equality). 
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relationship and mutual respect on each other’s 
territory and sovereignty. 
 
Zhou noted that, although it seems unreasonable to make 
diplomatic relationships conditional, these conditions were 
necessary, reasonable and practical from the perspective of the 
PRC after liberation.323  This was because the PRC government 
would not tolerate a country that had established diplomatic 
relations with the PRC to stay in touch with the Kuomintang 
situated in Taiwan, which would give rise to the “Two Chinas” 
situation and which would need a process of negotiation in order 
to resolve it.324 
Concerning half-diplomatic relationships, Zhou described 
this as when both parties stay at the stage of sending chargé 
d’affaires to each other.325  Zhou gave the example of the Sino-
British relationship and Sino-Dutch relationship for a long 
while, which was abnormal.326  Almost as an aside, Zhou 
observed that unofficial diplomatic relations would be something 
akin to Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks.327  Finally, citizen 
diplomacy included visits of individuals and civil groups, where 
these entities might be able to reach a certain consensus on 
particular matters and perhaps even make a joint declaration, 
which would be a type of creative diplomacy.328 
 
10.  Treaty Law 
 
Chapter Ten started by introducing the three conditions for 
a treaty: (1) the full qualification of the contracting state; (2) 
voluntary consent; and (3) legality and possible purpose. Zhou 
accused imperialist states of breaching their treaty obligations, 
and in any event, unequal treaties entered into under duress 
would be void and unenforceable. 
Concerning the three conditions for a treaty, Zhou 
elaborated on the full qualification of the contracting state when 
 
323.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 507. 
324.  See id. 
325.  See id. at 510-11. 
326.  See id. 
327.  See id. at 512. 
328.  See id. at 517. 
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he asserted that only a state can make a treaty.329  Zhou 
explained that Western jurists have categorized states into 
sovereign states and half-sovereign states, which undermined 
the rights of the latter group to make treaties.330  Zhou declared 
this as being incorrect because half-sovereign states are the 
result of colonialism during imperial expansion.331  
Nevertheless, half-sovereign states almost were non-existent at 
the time of Zhou’s writing, and so he concluded that all states 
could make treaties at that time.332  Zhou emphasized the states 
in a federal form of government—such as Switzerland—could 
make treaties in accordance with the constitution, but 
administrative regions and autonomous regions in a unitary 
state would have no right to make treaties.333  Zhou gave an 
example of the Simla Accord in 1914, which the Chinese 
government saw as void because the Tibet local government 
signed it.334  With regard to the other conditions for a treaty, 
Zhou asserted that treaties can be void for error, fraud and 
duress, and that the rights and duties confirmed by the treaty 
must be practical and legitimate.335 
Zhou concluded with observations that imperialist states 
always break the principle of adhering to treaties.336  He gave an 
example of the United States breaking the Geneva Convention 
in 1954 regarding the Indo-China dispute when it invaded 
Vietnam,337 although he did not elaborate on the reasons for this.  
Nevertheless, Zhou believed that there needs to be sanctions 
against treaty breakers in order to preserve the enforceability of 
treaties.338  At the same time, he observed that the obligation to 
adhere to a treaty cannot be absolute because the nature and 
existence of some treaties are special, and it might be 
unreasonable or unjust to enforce particular treaties.339  Zhou 
 
329.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 603. 
330.  See id. 
331.  See id. 
332.  See id. 
333.  See id. 
334.  See id. 
335.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 604–05. 
336.  See id. at 650. 
337.  See id. 
338.  See id. 
339.  See id. at 651. 
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believed that such flexibility could be applied with the unequal 
treaties that were forced upon weak states by imperialist states, 
as well as treaties outdated due to changed circumstances.340 
 
11. International Organizations 
 
Chapter Eleven on international organizations strongly 
criticized the United States for manipulating the United Nations 
in order to obstruct the PRC from returning to the United 
Nations as the representative of China.  This point was in line 
with PRC policies at that time.341  In addition, Zhou pointed out 
how the United States manipulated the United Nations to 
initiate the Korean War and the military intervention in the 
Congo.  The Chapter also briefly introduced some regional 
organizations, such as the Organization of American States, the 
League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity, all 
of which was relatively descriptive in nature. 
Zhou saw international organizations as both platforms for 
international cooperation as well as arena for international 
struggles.342  In particular, he asserted that imperialists make 
use of their status in international organizations in order to 
interfere with the internal affairs and undermine the 
sovereignty of other states.343  Zhou believed this inevitably 
would result in opposition to an organization, such as U.S. 
manipulation of the United Nations in order to promote the “Two 
Chinas Scheme” that left the Chinese people with no choice but 
to fight against the United Nations.344 
Zhou shifted his attention to the League of Nations, which 
had been founded in order to secure the fruits of victory of the 
imperialist states after the First World War and implement 
hostile policies against the Soviet Union.345  Zhou asserted that 
the League of Nations had its weaknesses from the day it was 
founded, including the constitutional exclusion of the Soviet 
 
340.  See id. 
341.  See China Asks for Nothing, supra note 24; Fundamental Problem, 
supra note 23; Superstitious Beliefs, supra note 20. 
342.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 687. 
343.  See id. 
344.  See id. 
345.  See id. at 689. 
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Union and the United States, which left it lacking 
representativeness.346  Interestingly, this assertion is not 
actually reflected in the Covenant of the League of Nations, so it 
is unclear why Zhou would make this assertion.  In terms of its 
organization and procedure, Zhou explained that the power of 
the Council and the Assembly were unclear and that all the 
resolutions required unanimous decision, which reduced the 
organization’s flexibility.347  Zhou clarified that, since the 
founding of the League, it had failed to perform its functions as 
an international organization, especially during the expansion 
of fascism in the 1930s, and it generally showed its incompetence 
in keeping world peace.348  As an example, Zhou pointed to when 
Japan invaded the northeast of China in 1931 and the League 
did not take action, apart from sending an investigation team to 
China, making a report and adopting a report that favored the 
Japanese invaders.349  Zhou also pointed to Fascist Italy’s 
invasion of Abyssinia, when the League only passed an 
incomplete financial sanction, which resulted in Abyssinia being 
conquered by Fascist Italy.350  Even though the Soviet Union 
joined the League by 1934, the League failed to stop Nazi 
Germany’s expansion within Europe, eventually leading to the 
dissolution of the League.351 
With regard to the United Nations, Zhou described how the 
Security Council holds the most political significance, which it 
uses to act against the UN’s principles and purposes.352  Zhou 
elaborated that it failed to keep world peace, and it even 
provided excuses for imperialist military invasions.353  For 
example, the United Nations passed a resolution in 1950 to 
establish a U.S.-led UN Command to start a war against Korea, 
with another example being the UN’s military intervention into 
the Congo in 1960.354  Turning his attention to the UN Secretary 
General, he explained that, by nature, that position is only 
 
346.  See id. at 690–91. 
347.  See id. 
348.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 690–91. 
349.  See id. 
350.  See id. 
351.  See id. at 692. 
352.  See id. at 712. 
353.  See id. 
354.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 712. 
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responsible for the administrative affairs of the United Nations, 
although it also carries out some political missions.355  Zhou 
went on to say that manipulation by U.S. imperialism often 
leads the Secretary General to abuse power by interfering in 
other states’ affairs.356  This point was in line with PRC policies 
at that time.357 
Zhou then analyzed UN Charter Article 103 concerning UN 
Charter obligations prevailing over conflicting obligations, 
pointing out that the rule concerned different conflicts: one 
between member states’ Charter and treaty obligations, and 
another between member states’ and non-member-states’ 
Charter and treaty obligations.358  Concerning the former 
situation, the Charter obligation must prevail.  Article 103 also 
prevails in the second situation because a member state, being 
a party of a multi-states treaty, cannot change its obligations 
under the treaty unless other parties to the treaty agree.359  
Concerning the latter situation, Zhou said it is problematic 
because the Charter has no effect on non-member states, 
although some Western jurists argue that the Charter is a basic 
law in international society and a social norm, so even non-
member states have to give way to it.360  Zhou concluded that 
this argument exaggerates the effects of the Charter, rendering 
it unconvincing.361 
With regard to China’s representation within the United 
Nations, Zhou explained that this has been a significant issue 
since the PRC’s establishment.362  Zhou concluded that this was 
a serious mistake inasmuch as China was a UN founding 
member and permanent member of the Security Council, all of 
which shows the importance of China in the United Nations.363  
Here,  Zhou  seemed  to  be   asserting   that   China   meant   the  
 
 
355.  See id. at 720. 
356.  See id. 
357.  See An Ugly Drama, supra note 25; Look!, supra note 21. 
358.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 720–21. 
359.  See id. 
360.  See id. 
361.  See id. 
362.  See id. at 725. 
363.  See id. 
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People’s Republic of China, that China had been disrespected by 
its treatment within the United Nations, or both. 
Zhou elaborated that Chinese people love peace, that China 
supported the Allies during the Second World War and that the 
establish of the Chinese Communist Party was by the peaceful 
will of the Chinese people.364  This point obviously was in line 
with PRC policies at that time,365 and it would emphasize the 
democratic or representative elements of the People’s Republic 
of China.  As an example of China’s connection to the United 
Nations, Zhou pointed out how, in 1945, before the San 
Francisco Conference, Mao stated in an article: 
 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) totally 
agrees with the suggestions made in the 
Dumbarton Oak Conference and the decision 
made in the Crimea Conference. The CCP 
welcomes the San Francisco Conference. The CCP 
has sent its representative to attend the San 
Francisco Conference to represent the will of the 
Chinese people.366 
 
Zhou explained that on October 1, 1949, Mao declared “this 
government (the PRC government) is the only legitimate 
government that represents the PRC’s people;” therefore, the 
representatives of the Republic of China government who 
attended the UN Conference were part of an exiled group that 
did not represent the Chinese people.367  The PRC requested the 
United Nations to disqualify the Republic of China 
representatives, with other states like the Soviet Union 
providing support for the PRC’s legitimate rights and status in 
the United Nations.368  Zhou developed support for this point by 
pointing to the support that other states, especially from Asian 
and African states, have given the PRC within the United 
 
364.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 726. 
365.  See Celebration of the Right of the People’s Republic of China is 
Resumed [祝贺恢复我国在联合国的合法权利], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人民日报], Oct. 
31, 1971 [hereinafter Celebration]. 
366.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 726. 
367.  See id. at 727. 
368.  See id. 
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Nations.369  Zhou concluded that the United Nations was 
fundamentally wrong in the way it dealt with China’s 
representation within the United Nations.370  Not only did the 
United Nations violate the Charter, but it also ruined its 
reputation inasmuch as the PRC was the only legitimate 
government for China, and the United Nations excluded it due 
to manipulation and misinterpretation of the UN Charter by the 
United States.371  In particular, Zhou asserted that 
reinstatement of the PRC’s legitimate rights within the United 
Nations should be a procedural matter that did not require a 
two-thirds majority vote in accordance with Article 18 of the UN 
Charter.372 
Just as the United States had manipulated the United 
Nations in order to promote its own interests, Zhou asserted that 
the United States manipulated the Organization of American 
States in the name of the Monroe Doctrine.373  He pointed to the 
declaration to oppose International Communism in 1954 and the 
decision to expel Cuba from the Pan-American Union in 1962 as 
examples.374  Zhou praised states such as Mexico that stood up 
to the United States.375  Zhou similarly praised the League of 
Arab States for standing up for Arab rights in Palestine and for 
pushing back against British and American imperialist efforts 
in Egypt and elsewhere.376  The Organization of African Unity 
likewise defended equality and the protection of African 
interests when supporting liberation of colonies, while at the 
same time helping resolve disputes between member states, 
such as the Algeria and Morocco border dispute and the Somalia 
and Ethiopia border dispute.377  This acted as a useful segue into 




369.  See id. 
370.  See id. at 747. 
371.  See id. 
372.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 747. 
373.  See id. 
374.  See id. 
375.  See id. 
376.  See id. 
377.  See id. 
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12. Peaceful Resolution of International Disputes 
 
Chapter Twelve on the peaceful resolution of international 
disputes started with Zhou emphasizing the PRC’s commitment 
to negotiated settlement of disputes, giving as examples the 
border dispute between China and Burma in 1960 and the 
border dispute between China and India on Tibet in 1954.378  
This point was in line with PRC policies at that time.379  Zhou 
explained that, even with the U.S. government that had been 
hostile towards the PRC in the past, the PRC still was willing to 
negotiate with the United States to resolve the Taiwan issue, 
with China-U.S. Ambassadorial talks having taken place in 
Warsaw on that issue.380  This, too, was in line with PRC policies 
at that time.381 
On international arbitration, Zhou stated that the PRC 
prefers direct negotiation over international arbitration.382  At 
that time, most of the PRC’s foreign trade agreements did not 
include an arbitration clause.383  Moreover, the use of 
international arbitration with border disputes was seen as 
particularly unsuitable because border disputes relate to 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.384  Zhou pointed to the 
Sino-Indian Border Dispute as an example, where the Indian 
government insisted on handing the matter of interpretation of 
the Simla Accord through international arbitration, whereas the 
PRC preferred not to use international arbitration for such 
matters that involved PRC internal affairs and sovereignty 
issues.385 
With regard to the International Court of Justice, Zhou 
asserted that the system of electing judges tilted the process in 
favor of Western imperialist states because they have double 
 
378.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 760. 
379.  See Celebration, supra note 365; Guo Moruo Made a Speech 
Concerning the Achievement of Asian-African Conference [中国人民保卫世界和
平委员会主席郭沫若 中国人民保卫世界和平委员会主席郭沫若], PEOPLE’S DAILY [
人民日报], May 8, 1955. 
380.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 760. 
381.  See Authentic Friendly-Equal Diplomatic Relations, supra note 141.  
382.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 776–77. 
383.  See id. 
384.  See id. 
385.  See id. 
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votes as members of the Security Council.386  In this context, 
Zhou alluded to there not being a difference between permanent 
members and temporary members when it comes to Security 
Council voting,387 but this ignores the veto powers of the 
permanent members. 
On the effectiveness of the resolution of disputes by the 
United Nations, Zhou noted that, while the rules regarding 
dispute resolution in the UN Charter are obviously more 
comprehensive and democratic than the League of Nations 
Covenant, especially on the coherence between the aims and 
principles, the execution of these rules in practice is a complete 
failure.388  Zhou again criticized the United States for 
manipulating the United Nations and worsening international 
disputes in order to gain benefits for itself instead of actually 
resolving the disputes.389  Zhou portrayed the UN’s solutions to 
disputes as unjust and impractical.390  As a result, some of these 
disputes turned into armed conflicts and even became excuses 
for imperialist states to intervene in other states’ affairs or to 
take military actions.391  For example, the discrimination in 
South Africa that was raised by India in 1946, the conflicts 
between Israel and Arab states since 1947 and the Kashmir 
conflict in 1948 all escalated in this matter.392  For the Kashmir 
conflict, the United Nations, under the manipulation of 
imperialist states, allowed India to invade Kashmir and did not 
take the advice of the implementing referendum, which left the 
India-Pakistan conflicts unresolved.393 
This Section has shown how Zhou’s International Law 
engaged with the main topics and problems of international law 
at that time by providing views based on his observations that 
largely were unique from both PRC policies and Western 
perspectives of international law, although Zhou clearly was 
aware of both of these.  Zhou limited the ideological statements 
 
386.  See id. at 783. 
387.  See id. 
388.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 784. 
389.  See id. 
390.  See id. 
391.  See id. 
392.  See id. 
393.  See ZHOU, supra note 34, at 784. 
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about international law, which appears to have been typical 
during that period within the Chinese international law 
epistemic community.  Zhou even was criticized by his editors 
for his focus on Western bourgeois international law, as 
contained in the preface to the 1976 version.  All of these factors 
suggest that Zhou’s International Law had significant scholarly 
characteristics to it. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
As Edgar Allan Poe wrote, “The best place to hide is in plain 
sight.”394  As alluded to in the introduction of this Article, 
Hungdah Chiu asserted in 1987 that “no scholarly writings on 
international law were published in the People’s Republic of 
China” between 1965 and 1979.395  Numerous U.S.-based 
international law scholars have repeated this assertion.  This 
Article has shown that there was at least one scholarly 
publication on international law from the PRC during this time 
period—Zhou Gengsheng’s book International Law.  Therefore, 
one can say that Zhou’s International Law has been hiding in 
plain sight—hence the reference to “semisecret” in the title of 
this Article, along with the fact that Zhou is well known among 
PRC international law scholars.  Indeed, Hungdah Chiu clearly 
knew about this publication inasmuch as he wrote a review of 
this work, as did two other Chinese commentators.  However, 
there is limited evidence that Western scholars have read these 
reviews, given the lack of citations to these reviews, let alone to 
the original source.  Future publications will be left to surmise 
why U.S.-based international law scholars ignored this source 
when repeating Hungdah Chiu’s 1987 assertion, assuming those 
scholars themselves do not respond to this Article.  The 
introductory portion suggested that Hungdah Chiu may have 
ignored Zhou’s International Law because he saw a lack of 
scholarly value in this work because it was too similar to 
Oppenheim’s International Law and mirrored PRC policies 
towards international law at that time.  This Article has shown 
 
394.  Edgar Allan Poe, The Purloined Letter, in ELEONORA, THE FALL OF 
THE HOUSE OF USHER & THE PURLOINED LETTER (1917). 
395.  Chiu, supra note 1, at 1127. 
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that Zhou’s International Law was an entirely different book 
from Oppenheim’s International Law and that it varied 
considerably from PRC policies towards international law on a 
number of important issues, including his views on the custom 
of premature recognition of an emerging state and allowance of 
intervention on humanitarian grounds, as well as support for 
the fight for independence of former colonies and issues of 
migration of people with a particular race or nationality.  
Moreover, this Article has shown that Zhou’s perspective on 
international law actually was considerably progressive 
compared to Western literature from that time.  Such 
progressiveness underlines the work’s originality, although it 
must be noted that progressiveness is not a requirement for a 
work to be deemed scholarly.  In short, any reasonable 
commentator in the 1980s with knowledge of Oppenheim’s 
International Law, PRC policies towards international law 
between 1965 and 1979 and Western international law 
literature from that time period would have no choice but to 
recognize the scholarly characteristics of Zhou’s International 
Law, if not classify it all as a scholarly piece of work. 
It is interesting to speculated on why erstwhile 
commentators ignored Zhou’s International Law.  Commentator 
Gu Ming Dong employed the word Sinologism in 2013 to capture 
how Western and Chinese scholars alike often mischaracterize 
Chinese culture, not based on “obvious factors of 
misinformation, biases and prejudices or political interference,” 
but rather on “epistemological and methodological 
underpinnings that has become a cultural unconscious.”396  A 
surprising number of members of the international law 
epistemic community believe that the PRC was non-
participatory or indifferent towards international law during the 
Mao era,397 not just the late-Mao era and not just among PRC 
 
396.  MING D. GU, SINOLOGISM: AN ALTERNATIVE TO ORIENTALISM AND 
POSTCOLONIALISM 1–2 (2012). 
397.  See, e.g., Syllabus of Thomas E. Kellogg & Anthea Roberts, China 
and International Law, (Spring 2015) (on file with the author) (asserting that 
China had an “ambivalent attitude towards many key aspects of international 
law and the architecture of global order” during the Mao era); JEROME COHEN 
& HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY 
STUDY 14–22 (1974) (when discussing the post-1949 PRC approach to 
international law, they only talked about either domestic law or foreign policy, 
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international law scholars.  This assertion has been made 
notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence to the contrary that 
the PRC actively has upheld the state-centered interpretation of 
the international legal order, which focuses on state sovereignty 
and non-intervention, inter alia.  To be more specific, the PRC 
appears to have employed a hybrid Marxist-Hobbesian-Kantian 
approach to international law during the Mao era,398 an 
approach that future publications will explore further.  Suffice 
it to say that such an approach is far from being non-
participatory or indifferent towards international law, just that 
the PRC did not blindly fall in line with Western notions of 
international law, which tend to include democratic and liberal 
 
not about international law per se); ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND GLOBAL SECURITY 62–64 (2007) (“China 
initially showed little interest in, or respect for, the norms, principles, and even 
rules of the international organizations it joined. It was only after 1978 . . . that 
it began to reassess its interests in the light of organizational norms, to 
acknowledge, if only in practice, the negotiability of its sovereignty, and to 
accept the costs as well as the advantages of organizational participation. Most 
important, it was only after 1978 that China learnt the importance of 
reciprocal compliance as a foundation of international trust and cooperation.”).  
398.  See, e.g., FU CHU, RUSK’S ‘INTERNATIONAL LAW’ CANNOT CONCEAL THE 
CRIME OF AGGRESSION AGAINST VIETNAM BY AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, IN PEOPLE’S 
CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY LOC.1487 (Jerome A. 
Cohen & Hungdah Chiu eds., 1974) (ebook) (building up the PRC’s role as 
defender of international law in 1965); Shih Sung et al., An Initial 
Investigation Into the Old-Law Viewpoint in the Teaching of International Law, 
in PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 31–32 
(Jerome A. Cohen & Hungdah Chiu eds. 1974) (focusing on international law 
and class struggle); Qiao Guanhua, The Speech of Qiao Guanhua: The 
Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to the UN General 
Assembly [中华人民共和国代表团团长乔冠华在联合国大会上的发言], 13 RED 
FLAG [红旗] 39 (1971) (calling for international peace by states working 
together to promote sovereignty and independence); Lü Shilun, The Natural 
Law in Service of Imperialism [为帝国主义服务的自然法学], PEOPLE’S DAILY [人
民日报（理论版)], June 29, 1963, at 62–64 (rejecting natural-law approach to 
international law as an imperialist tool); Yang Xin & Chen Jian, Exposing and 
Criticizing the Fallacious Reasoning of Imperialists on Questions Concerning 
National Sovereignty [揭露和批判帝国主义者关于国家主权问题的谬论], 4 STUDS. 
POL. & L. [政法研究] 6, 6, 15–16, 19–20 (1964) (focusing on limitless 
sovereignty); Zhou Ziya, Talks on the Question of the Suez Canal [谈苏伊士运
河问题], 3 LEGAL STUDS. [法学] 35, 35–37 (1956) (justifying Egypt’s taking of 
the Suez Canal in terms of international law); see also Speech, Xue Hanqin, 
Speaker International Law in a Pluralistic World [多元世界里的国际法], 
Statement on reception of Doctor of Law (Honoris Causa) (Dec. 17, 2014), 
www.um.edu.mo (last visited Mar. 23, 2019) (alluding to all three of these 
approaches in the context of the PRC’s approach to international law). 
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values.399  Regardless, like the U.S.-based commentators who 
repeated Chiu’s assertion that the PRC produced no 
international law scholarship in the late Mao era, these 
members of the international law epistemic community have no 
obvious biases or reasons to provide inaccurate views about the 
PRC’s approach to international law during the Mao era.  On the 
contrary, given their ongoing academic interests in the People’s 
Republic of China, they have an obvious incentive to provide 
views that are consistent with PRC policies, assuming they want 
continued access to the PRC for their research purposes.400  
Therefore, it seems easy to chalk these inaccurate views up to 
the underlying “cultural unconscious,” as opposed to 
“misinformation, biases and prejudices or political 
interference,”401 as Gu Ming Dong explained.  Although pure 
speculation, it is possible that Hungdah Chiu’s downplaying of 
PRC international law scholarship during the late Mao era in 
general and the importance of Zhou’s International Law in 
particular did not reflect a conscious bias against the PRC and 
PRC scholarship, although it certainly was a possibility that he 
harbored some biases.402  After all, Chiu was born in Taiwan, 
 
399.  For a discussion regarding some Western commentators’ somewhat 
biased views of international law, see generally James D. Fry, Pluralism, 
Religion and the Moral Fairness of International Law, 4 OXFORD. J. L. & RELIG, 
393 (2014) (exploring Thomas Franck’s approach to understanding the moral 
fairness of international law). 
400.  See, e.g., Carsten A. Holz, Have China Scholars All Been Bought?, 
FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 2007, at 36, http://ihome.ust.hk/~socholz/HaveChinaS 
cholarsAllBeenBought-FEER30April07.pdf (last visited June 14, 2019). To be 
clear, this obviously is not to say that these commentators or other 
commentators have been explicitly or implicitly bought or inappropriately 
influenced. 
401.  GU, supra note 396, at 1–2. 
402.  Indeed, Chiu occasionally presented specious characterizations of 
Mao-era international law scholarship.  For example, Chiu wrote in 1989: 
“During the Maoist era, not a single article devoted entirely to human rights 
was published in China.” Hungdah Chiu, Chinese Attitude Toward 
International Law of Human Rights in the Post-Mao Era, 5 OCCASIONAL 
PAPERS/PREPRINT SERIES CONTEMP. ASIAN STUDS. UNIV. MD. SCH. L., 1, 3 (1989). 
However, he failed to explain what was so important about having an article 
“devoted entirely” to human rights when broader works addressed human 
rights, such as Zhou Gengsheng’s handling of human rights in his 1963 article, 
Keng-Sheng, supra note 28, at 54–62 (providing the English translation), not 
to mention the reference to human rights in chapter 7 of Zhou’s International 
Law, as explained above.  Indeed, Soviet international law scholars never 
devoted an entire article to human rights stricto sensu, and yet that has not 
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taught there and served as Minister of State for Taiwan’s 
Executive Yuan (cabinet) for a year,403 and it is no mystery that 
the PRC and Taiwan have suffered from bad relations since the 
Chinese Civil War.404  Nevertheless, Chiu’s downplaying could 
have derived from his perception of the differences of the PRC 
approach compared to the Western approach at that time, as 
well as a mistaken belief that the Western approach was the 
only valid approach. As Chiu wrote in 1972: 
 
The Communist Chinese concept of unequal 
treaties is flexible and broad. The Communist 
Chinese consider this concept an important rule of 
the law of treaties. According to their view, an 
unequal treaty is invalid in international law. 
Such a concept of unequal treaties does not seem 
to have any support in the writings of Western 
international law scholars.405 
 
This quote shows how Chiu dismissed the PRC’s approach 
simply because it differed from the Western approach, even 
though the mainstream allowed for divergence in the form of 
regional and national approaches through dualism and 
 
stopped scholars from recognizing and taking seriously the Soviet approach to 
human rights.  See, e.g., Rein A. Müllerson, The International Protection of 
Human Rights and the Domestic Jurisdiction of States, in PERESTROIKA AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT ANGLO-SOVIET APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 62 (Anthony Carty & Gennady M. Danilenko eds. 1990). 
403.  See Ma Ying-Jeou, Tribute in Memory of Dr. Hungdah Chiu, 27 MD. 
J. INT’L L. 1 (2012); Dongsheng Zang, China’s “Attitude” Toward Human 
Rights: Reading Hungdah Chiu in the Era of the Iraq War, 27 MD. J. INT’L L. 
263, 267–68 (2012) (describing Hungdah Chiu’s life); In Memoriam: Professor 
Hungdah Chiu (1936-2011), DIGITAL COMMONS @ UM CAREY LAW, 
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/chiu/?utm_source=digitalcommon
s.law.umaryland.edu%2Fchiu%2F3&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PD
FCoverPages (last visited June 4, 2019). 
404.  See generally STEVEN M. GOLDSTEIN, CHINA AND TAIWAN (2015); 
RICHARD C. BUSH, UNCHARTED STRAIT, THE FUTURE OF CHINA-TAIWAN 
RELATIONS (2013).  Future researchers might want to explore the possible 
biases inherent in Chiu’s opinions, in particular whether they reflect official 
Taiwanese positions.  The differences and animosities between the PRC and 
Taiwan already have been well identified and analyzed elsewhere.  Future 
research might show that these political complexities between the PRC and 
Taiwan were the main reason why Chiu downplayed or ignored Zhou’s book. 
405.  Chiu, supra note 80, at 239, 267. 
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autopoiesis.406  Clearly Chiu adopted a more liberal approach to 
international law than that of the PRC at this time.407  However, 
that is no basis to entirely dismiss the PRC’s international law 
scholarship from the late Mao era, which was then and continues 
to be state centered in nature.408  After all, such an approach to 
international law was then and continues to be the dominant 
approach in general.409 
The comparisons throughout this Article between 
Oppenheim’s International Law and Zhou’s International Law 
show that Zhou at least noticed Western descriptions of 
international law and tried to respond to them.  The Western 
literature does not appear to have engaged with the PRC 
literature in the same way, almost as if Western scholars felt 
 
406.  See generally GREIG, supra note 79, at 52–53; Leo Gross, 
Autointerpretation In International Law, in 1 ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND ORGANIZATION 383–86 (1984); TIMOTHY HILLIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 18 (1994); PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (7th ed, 1997).  For an interesting overview of the 
different approaches to international law, see Martti Koskenniemi, A History 
of International Law Histories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 943 (Barbo Fassbinder & Anne Peters eds., 2012). 
407.  See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 402, at 1, 39 (“Post-Mao China’s attitude 
toward international law appears to be a relatively positive one. Never, since 
the Communists came to power in China, has China shown such an interest in 
international law. This changing attitude is the result of the new political and 
economic policy of the post-Mao Chinese leaders, who are more interested in 
modernization than world revolution. To achieve the goal of modernization, the 
introduction of Western technology and investment into China is 
indispensable. International law serves as a useful tool to facilitate such 
intercourse between China and the outside world. This truth also explains the 
reason why China’s interest in international law has now gone beyond the 
traditional scope of international law and includes international economic law 
and related fields.”). 
408.  See, e.g., XUE HANQIN, CHINESE CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORY, CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (2012); 
Tieya, supra note 18, at 356; Xue Hanqin, International Law in a Pluralistic 
World [Duoyuan shijie li de guojifa], Speech Given at the University of Macao, 
Dec. 17, 2014, www.wells.org.cn/Article/ShowDetail/1378 (last visited June 14, 
2019).  
409.  See HANS MORGENTHAU, THE POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 40 (1948); 
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (3d ed. 1991); A. Claire 
Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International 
Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT’L STUD. 133, 133–
36 (2001); David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: 
History of an Illusion, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 99, 110 (1997); Mark W. Janis, 
Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 17 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 61 (1984). 
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that the PRC had nothing to contribute to the discourse.  Jerome 
Cohen astutely recognized this situation in 1972, justifying 
Western scholars’ neglect of PRC’s positions on public 
international law due to their “sweeping, ideological nature” 
from the “crude generalizations [often being] based upon 
allegations made by the executive or legislative branches of the 
United States government, which continued to support the 
PRC’s Nationalist rival in the Chinese civil war” and supported 
by materials from Nationalist China.410  There certainly were 
many international law pieces by PRC commentators that 
contained such ideological generalizations.  However, as this 
Article has shown, it would be a mistake to dismiss all PRC 
international law literature from this time period on this basis. 
 
 
410.  Jerome A. Cohen, Introduction, in CHINA’S PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES 1, 1–2 (Jerome A. Cohen ed. 1972) 
(“[I]t is surprising that there have thus far been so few studies of the twenty-
year record of the People’s Republic (PRC) in international law”); see also 
Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law—and Our 
Own, in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 
282, 291 (Jerome A. Cohen ed. 1970) (“Plainly, if the process of integrating 
China into the family of nations is ever to be completed, students of 
international law will have to empathize rather than moralize, and give the 
PRC’s words and deeds a fair hearing. It is not enough merely to quote Chinese 
Communist statements, such as those asserting that the United States and the 
Soviet Union dominate the United Nations, or that the United States has no 
intention of disarming, as though these assertions carry their own refutation; 
we should inquire in each instance to what extent there is evidence to support 
the Chinese belief.”).  Cohen seems to have been the only Western 
international law scholar to have publicly recognized the possibility that there 
might be more to the PRC’s approach to international law during its early days.  
His apolitical open-mindedness on these issues is to be commended. 
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